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THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD
ABSTRACT
Despite two years of aggressive diplomacy, the December 2009
Copenhagen Conference failed to create an internationally binding
treaty to abate global warming. The negotiations resulted only in
an aspirational, three-page interim agreement. While its brevity
and clear retreat from the legal obligations of the Kyoto Protocol
are disappointing, the Copenhagen Accord is nonetheless signifi-
cant in many regards. It sets a goal of limiting global temperature
rise to 2 degrees Celsius, contains an obligation for hundreds of
billions of dollars to flow from developed states to the developing
world, and establishes a new mechanism to prevent deforestation.
The most significant result of the Conference, however, is the
codification of responsibilities for developing nations - including
China and India - to address global warming for the first time.
This represents a fundamental shift in the balance between the
environmental law maxims of "common but differentiated respon-
sibilities" (paramount in the Kyoto Protocol order) and the
"polluter pays" principle, now silently incorporated. As a result,
post-Copenhagen climate diplomacy may undergo a significant
realignment. Whereas the international community arrived divided
along North-South lines, many nations left Copenhagen frustrated
by the relatively inflexible attitudes of the world's two largest
greenhouse gas emitters. the United States and China. Both
nations managed to preserve their bottom lines at Copenhagen, but
subsequent negotiating rounds will feature more power struggles
regarding the global governance of climate change. This article is
intended to provide a detailed summary and analysis of the
Copenhagen Conference and its fundamental document, the
Copenhagen Accord The legal and diplomatic implications of both
are parsed, with special focus upon the two nations rightfully
receiving the most attention, acclaim and blame for anthro-
pomorphic climate change.
32010-2011]1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite years of advance diplomacy, the December 2009
Copenhagen Conference failed to create a legally binding plan to
abate global warming. Instead, the negotiations resulted in a three-
page interim agreement based on moral principles and future
actions. The Copenhagen Accord, as the document is titled, has
been bitterly attacked. Among many desired provisions missing
from its sparse text are firm goals for delivering an international
treaty, or any mandatory national targets for greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions reductions. To activists it may at best represent a
disappointing conclusion to a two-year process intended to produce
a comprehensive and enforceable action plan; at worst it can be
viewed as undermining almost two decades of UN efforts to
mitigate climate change. Few are satisfied by its moral and
precedential breakthroughs, or characterize it as a progressive step
along a daunting path.
Despite its many shortcomings, the Copenhagen Accord is
momentous and contains hard-fought compromises on many
difficult issues. For example, it sets a goal of limiting GHG-
induced global temperature rise to 2-degrees Celsius ("20C") above
pre-industrial levels by 2050. Such an enterprise implies deep
emission cuts over the next four decades. The Accord also contains
a legal obligation for hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars to flow
from developed states to the developing world, and a promising
new mechanism for the prevention of deforestation.
Most importantly, the Accord codifies the responsibility for
and commitments of individual nations to act on their own to
address global warming including, for the first time, powerhouse
developing states like China and India. However, while a system
for monitoring and reporting progress toward those national goals
is provided for, there are no requisite international surveillance
practices - a compromise over which China bargained hard. These
developments represent a fundamental ideological shift from the
Kyoto Protocol order. Whereas the environmental law principle of
"common but differentiated responsibilities" was absolutely
paramount in the Kyoto regime, the inclusion of responsibilities for
the largest developing countries incorporates the "polluter pays"
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principle, which is favored by the developed world. Indeed, nations
that arrived divided between North and South, developed and
developing, and rich and poor, left frustrated by the relatively
inflexible attitudes of the United States and China. It remains to be
seen whether they may now realign and rally around the polluter
pays principle to pressure the world's two largest overall
greenhouse gas emitters into greater concessions. Both sides
managed to compromise while preserving their bottom lines at
Copenhagen, but the next rounds of negotiations will bring more
critical power contests regarding the global governance of climate
change.
This article is intended to provide a detailed summary and
analysis of the Copenhagen Conference and its fundamental
document, the Copenhagen Accord. Both the legal and diplomatic
implications of the Conference and its aftermath are considered.
Special focus is placed upon the two nations rightfully receiving
the most attention, acclaim and blame: the United States of
America and the People's Republic of China. After this
introduction, Section II presents a brief overview of the two-
decade old United Nations process to address climate change as
primer. In Section III, the extensive international negotiations
following the Bali Conference (2007) and leading up to the
Copenhagen Conference (2009) are discussed, as well as domestic
and bilateral events within and between the United States and
China. The negotiating positions of the two sides are extrapolated
and explained therein. Section IV provides a day-by-day narrative
of diplomacy at the Copenhagen Conference assembled from
official statements, press releases, news coverage and individual
accounts. Section V analyzes the Accord's legalities in detail,
especially regarding the key issues of emissions cuts, financing,
verification, technology transfer and deforestation. Section VI
refocuses to analyze the Copenhagen Conference and Accord from
a broader diplomatic perspective, concluding that the United States
and China are now exposed as the key actors on the world stage.
As a result, they must take meaningful bilateral action to lead the
fight against global climate change in the decades ahead. The most
recent developments in Sino-US efforts on fighting climate change
indicate that both countries take the issue seriously and have
6 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
started to advance bilateral mechanisms. Such developments must
be encouraged as they may prove to be more effective than multi-
party negotiation.
H1. BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO COPENHAGEN
Tremendous concentrations of heat-trapping GHGs are
accruing in Earth's atmosphere as a result of the burning of fossil
fuels and deforestation.' "These gases prevent heat from escaping
to space... [and] as the concentrations of these gases continue to
increase in the atmosphere, the Earth's temperature is climbing
above past levels". 2According to data from the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Earth's
average surface temperature increased by 1.2 to 1.4 F (0.66 -
0.77 0 C) in the last century. 3 Since 1850, records show the eight
warmest years have all occurred since 1998, the warmest being the
year 2005.4 "[C]limate models predict that the average temperature
at the Earth's surface could increase from 3.2 to 7.2 0 F (1.77-4.0'C)
above 1990 levels by the end of this century" if the emissions are
unabated.5 These changes are expected to have catastrophic effects
on human, animal and plant life on Earth, as changes in
temperature, rainfall patterns, snow cover, and sea levels sew
devastation. 6
1 Climate Change, Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Basic Information]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT
21 (1995); James L. Olstead, The Global Warming Crisis: An Analytical
Framework to Regional Responses, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 125, 128 (2008).
2 Basic Information, supra note 1.3 Id
4 Id.; see also Adam Voiland, 2009: Second Warmest Year on Record; End of
the Warmest Decade, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
(Jan. 21, 2001), http://www.giss. nasa.gov/research/news/20100121; James
Hansen et al., Global Temperature Change, 103(39) Proc. Of the Nat'1 Acad. Of
Sci. 14288 (2006), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/103/39/14288.full.pdf.
3.2 to 7.20 Fahrenheit. Basic Information, supra note 1.6 Id.
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The United Nations (UN) has led the effort to solve this
climate change crisis for over 20 years. Upon due consideration of
the scientific data, its member nations have agreed that the reality
of global warming is "unequivocal" and that delayed action would
increase the risk of "severe climate change impacts."7 This section
summarizes that process in unjust brevity, providing a humble
primer to the two decades of climate change negotiations
preceding Copenhagen while not discussing any one development
or mechanism in the detail that it merits. Where possible,
perspective on the developing views of the United States and
China are injected.
A. 1987-1992: Early Awareness, Activism and Preparatory
Work
Climate change activism began in the 1970's, a decade of
discovery culminating in the First World Climate Conference held
at Geneva, Switzerland in February 1979. The evidence of
causation was inconclusive at that time, so the Conference focused
upon "climate variability" as opposed to "climate change."9
Scientific consensus about the impact of anthropomorphic emis-
sions on Earth's climate grew by the mid-1980's, at a time when
China was just beginning to experiment with Deng Xiaoping's
market reforms: piecemeal policies that would inspire a dynamic
manufacturing economy, propel China to economic superpower
status, and eventually earn it the title of the world's largest carbon
emitter.10 It was during those years that "[i]ncreasing scientific
evidence of human interference with the climate system, coupled
7 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties,
Thirteenth Session, Bali, Indon., Bali Action Plan, 3, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.l* (Mar. 14, 2008).
' The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) sponsored the Conference.
See John C. Rodda, The Second World Climate Conference,
www.iahs.info/hsj/360/hysj_36 01_0083.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
' Thus, phrases like "global warming," and "greenhouse effect" were not
prevalent in the proceedings. Id.
0 Id.; John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes U.S. as World's Biggest CO 2
Emitter, GUARDIAN, June 19, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews/print.
2010-2011]1 7
8 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
with growing public concern over global environmental issues,
began to push climate change onto the political agenda."" Though
consensus on that issue still eludes American policymakers today,
the United States in 1987 was instrumental in concerting action to
address one class of GHG - chlorofluorocarbons - and the growing
hole in the Ozone Layer they were causing. This diplomacy
ultimately led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol. 12 Later that year,
with international environmental activism at an all-time high, the
UN elevated the issue of climate change to its broader agenda.
General Assembly Resolution 42/184, styled "International Co-
operation in the Field of the Environment," first stated that:
[The UN General Assembly] Agrees with the
Governing Council that the United Nations
Environment Programme should attach importance
to the problem of global climate change and that the
Executive Director should ensure that the Pro-
gramme co-operates closely with the World Meteor-
ological Organization and the International Council
of Scientific Unions and maintains an active,
influential role in the World Climate Programme. 13
One year later the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established the UN
" United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), A
Guide to the Climate Change Convention Process, Preliminary 2d ed., at 7
(2002), http://unfccc.int/resource/process/guideprocess-p.pdf (last visited Mar.
14, 2010) [hereinafter UNFCCC Guide].
12 The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (a
protocol added to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer)
is an international treaty designed to phase out production of substances
responsible for ozone depletion. Since entering into force in 1989, it has
undergone seven revisions: 1990 (London), 1991 (Nairobi), 1992 (Copenhagen),
1993 (Bangkok), 1995 (Vienna), 1997 (Montreal), and 1999 (Beijing). See
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
Misc. 1 (1988), Cmd. 283; 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1,
1989); See Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Program, U.N.
Doc EP/OzL. Pro. 2/3 (1990).
" G.A. Res. 42/184, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/184 (Dec 11, 1987).
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) "to provide
the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of climate
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
consequences."l 4 The IPCC is an intergovernmental scientific body
open to scientists from all UN and WMO member countries. It is
charged with reviewing and assessing the most recent scientific,
technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide
relevant to understanding climate change.' 5 Thousands of scientists
contribute to the work of the IPCC on a voluntary basis, while
governments participate in the review process and in the IPCC
plenary sessions.16 As its work has always been subject to hostile
scrutiny,' 7 the IPCC takes pride in asserting "when governments
accept the IPCC reports and approve their Summary for
Policymakers, they acknowledge the legitimacy of their scientific
content."' 8
In 1988, following a bold proposal by Malta, the UN
General Assembly directly attacked the issue of climate change for
14 At its 40th Session in 1988 the WMO Executive Council decided on the
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and
the UNEP Governing Council authorized UNEP's support for IPCC shortly
thereafter. IPCC, Sixteen Years of Scientific Assessment in Support of the
Climate Convention, Dec. 2004, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/10th-
anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2010); IPCC,
Organization, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010).
" It does not conduct independent research nor does it monitor climate related
data. IPCC, Organization, supra note 14.
16 The Panel, comprised of government delegations of all member countries,
meets approximately once a year at the plenary level. These Sessions are
attended by hundreds of officials and experts from relevant ministries, agencies
and research institutions from member countries and from participating
organizations. The main decisions about the IPCC work program are taken and
reports are accepted, adopted and approved in plenary session, and the IPCC
Bureau and Chairperson are also elected in the plenary sessions. Id.
17 John M. Broder, Scientists Taking Steps to Defend Work on Climate, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2,2010, at All.
18 Malta's proposal was entitled "Conservation of Climate as Part of the
Common Heritage of Mankind." What is the IPCC?, COPENHAGEN CLIMATE
COUNCIL, http://www.copenhagenclimatecouncil.com/get-informed/climate-
negotiations-updates/what-is-the-ipcc. html.
2010-2011]1 9
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the first time. 19 The General Assembly adopted Resolution 43/53
on the "Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind." 20 That document urged all governments,
intergovernmental (IGO) and non-governmental organizations
(NGO) and scientific institutions alike:
[T]o treat climate change as a priority issue, to
undertake and promote specific, co-operative
action-oriented programmes and research so as to
increase understanding on all sources and causes of
climate change, including its regional aspects and
specific time-frames as well as the cause and effect
relationship of human activities and climate, and to
contribute, as appropriate, with human and financial
resources to efforts to protect the global climate ...
21
Furthermore, the UN Resolution encouraged the convening of
conferences on climate change "at the national, regional and global
levels," 22 as well as endorsed and expressed appreciation for the
early progress of the IPCC.23
The IPCC published its set of First Assessment Reports
in 1990, confirming that human-induced climate change is a threat
and calling for an enforceable global treaty to address the
problem.24 The Second World Climate Conference echoed this
19 UNFCCC Guide, supra note 11, at 7.
20 Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind,
G.A. Res. 43/53, U.N. Doc.A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
21 Id. at 6.
22 d. at8.
23 Id. at 5.
24 The IPCC divides work within three working groups which each address a
particular subject area. The first assessment report was released in three issues
as follows: Working Group 1) Scientific Assessment of Climate change,
Working Group II) Impacts Assessment of Climate Change, and Working Group
Ill) The IPCC Response Strategies. See IPCC Reports,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/publications and data reports.htm
(last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
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call,25 albeit less forcefully than environmentalists would have
liked. 26 "This omission provoked some criticism from delegates
and observers who considered the EC target of achieving 1990
emissions levels for carbon dioxide by the year 2000 to be the
minimum basis of an acceptable policy for developed countries." 27
It was an important first step, as the participants recognized
climate change as a common concern of humankind, and adopted a
number of international environmental law principles to guide
future climate diplomacy: the principle of sustainable develop-
ment,28 the precautionary principle,29 and the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) for countries at different
25 The Second World Climate Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland,
from Oct. 29 to Nov. 7, 1990. Rodda, supra note 8.
26 The Ministerial Declaration that resulted "disappointed many of the
participating scientists as well as other observers because it did not offer a high
level of commitment." The Second World Climate Conference, Fact Sheet,
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, http://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/
senegal/fact/fs221.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
27 The Conference consisted of discussions among heads of government and
ministers from 137 states and the European Community. These discussions were
preceded by preparatory negotiations between government officials, which were
convened to prepare a text for submission to the ministers. Id.
28 Incorporated at UINFCCC Art. 3(4), sustainable development is the touchstone
for addressing climate change. It demands that development, poverty eradication
and climate protection should be considered in a holistic and integrated manner
while ensuring that developing countries have a right to development. United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 5, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc.A/AC.237/18, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
29 Codified at Art. 3(3) of the UNFCCC, the precautionary principle is also
described in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration: "In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]; see also Jason Buhi & Lin Feng, The International Joint
Commission's Role in the United States-Canada Transboundary Air Pollution
Control Regime: A Century of Experience to Guide the Future, 108 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 107, 130 (2009).
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levels of development.30 This last principle charges developed
countries with taking responsibility for their historical cumulative
and current per capita GHG emissions by substantially reducing
their pollution and providing support to developing countries to
take proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change. 31
The UN General Assembly responded to these calls in
December of 1990, formally launching negotiations on a frame-
work convention on climate change under the terms of Resolution
45/212.32 The negotiations began in February 1991 under the
auspices of an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC),
chaired by Jean Ripert of France. 33 These negotiations - combined
with the previous General Assembly resolutions, the findings of
the first IPCC Assessment Report of 1990, and the First and
Second Climate Change Conferences - led to the development of
the foundational UN convention on global warming.
B. 1992-1997: The UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)
After just 15 months, the INC adopted by consensus the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It
opened for signature at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED, better known as the "Earth Summit")
in Rio de Janeiro and entered into force in 1994. 34Along with the
UNFCCC, the Earth Summit produced the Rio Declaration - a list
of 27 principles intended to guide future sustainable development
around the world. Principle 16 enshrined the "Polluter Pays
30 Incorporated at UNFCCC Art. 3, supra note 28; Christopher D. Stone,
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J.
INTL. L. 276, 292 (2004).
31 See Stone, supra note 30 at 292.
32 UNFCCC Guide, supra note 11, at 7.
33Id.
3 Ratified on 4 June 1992 and coming into force on 21 Mar. 1994, the UNFCCC
is one of three conventions adopted at the Rio Earth Summit. The others - the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat
Desertification - also involve matters strongly affected by climate change.
UNFCCC Background Info, http://unfccc.int/essentialbackground/feeling the
heat/items/2913.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
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Principle" (PPP), a long-standing norm that encourages nations to
ensure that polluting actors bear the full environmental costs of
their activities.35 Unlike CBDR, this principle was not explicitly
incorporated into the UNFCCC, 36 but it nonetheless commands
great respect in international environmental law.
The UNFCCC sets an ultimate objective of stabilizing
GHG concentrations "at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system." 37 It further
states that "such a level should be achieved within a time-frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,
to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner." 38
Under the CBDR rationale, the heaviest burden for fighting climate
change is placed on the industrialized nations, reason being that
they are the historical source of most past and present GHG
emissions, and that economic development is difficult to achieve
even without climate considerations for poorer states.39 For the
most part, these developed nations (called "Annex I" countries
because they are listed in the first annex to the treaty) belonged to
3 A discussion of CBDR in the context of the UNFCCC process immediately
follows. The PPP is stated in the Rio Declaration, supra note 29. See also Jason
Buhi & Lin Feng, supra note 29 at 114 (discussing the origins of the "polluter
pays" principle all the way back to the 1931 Trail Smelter Case).
36 United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992,
art. 3(1) states:
"The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse
effects thereof."
37 Id. at art. 2.
38 Id.
39 See id. at preface 3, stating:
"Noting that the largest share of historical and current global
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed
countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are
still relatively low and that the share of global emissions
originating in developing countries will grow to meet their
social and development needs...";
See also UNFCCC Background Information, supra note 34.
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the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). 40 The UNFCCC envisions climate assistance from these
nations flowing to the developing world through the provision of
financial aid,41 information support,42 and technological transfers.43
By adopting this bifurcated framework, the Parties to the
UNFCCC accepted that the responsibilities of developing nations
would grow in future years. 44The Convention recognizes that it is a
flexible "framework" document intended to be amended over
time.45 Many of those amendments were adopted during the annual
Conferences of the Parties (COP), 4 6 composing a detailed rulebook
for the effective implementation of the Convention.47 With pride of
place among these is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
C. 1997-2007: The Kyoto Protocol
The only attempt at a globally binding treaty to manage
GHG emissions is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 48 The Kyoto Protocol
is linked to the UNFCCC, but whereas the Convention merely
encourages all Parties to the Convention to stabilize emissions,4
the Protocol commits the industrialized Parties to do so. 50 "The
40 UNFCCC, Annex I, supra note 28 at 23. This list also includes a number of
"transitional" economies including Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Slovenia and the Ukraine. The UNFCCC requires precise and
regularly updated inventories of GHG from these industrialized countries. Id. at
art. 4 paragraph 1(a). It merely encourages the developing countries to do the
same. Id.
41 Id. at art.4 3, 4, 7, 8, and art. 11.
42 Id. at art.4, 5.
43 Id. at art.4, 5 & 9, and art. 9.
44 Id.; see also UNFCCC, supra note 28, at art. 4 T 8. Today, nearly two decades
after its adoption, 192 nations are Parties to the UNFCCC. See generally
UNFCCC Background Information, supra note 34.
45 UNFCCC, supra note 28 at art. 15 (Amendments to the Convention), and
Art.16 (Adoption and Amendment of Annexes to the Convention).
46 Id. art. 7.
47 UNFCCC Guide, supra note 11.
48 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
49 UNFCCC, supra note 28 at art. 3, T 3.
0Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, at art. 2-3.
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major feature of Kyoto is that it sets binding targets for 37
industrialised countries and the European Community to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These amount to an average 5
percent cut in GHG emissions against a 1990 baseline over the
five-year period, 2008-2012."5 Building the UNFCCC before it,
the Protocol places a legal burden exclusively upon developed
nations under the CBDR principle.52Those industrialized countries
must meet their targets primarily through national measures,
engage in emissions monitoring,53 submit to a compliance system
ensuring that they are meeting their commitments, 54 and acquiesce
to penalties if they fail.55
The Kyoto Protocol offers some flexibility in meeting
those targets by way of three innovative market-based mecha-
51 Michael Hutchinson, Countdown to Copenhagen, MAYER BROWN (16 Nov.
2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=7963 &nid=6
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
52 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, at art. 10. Also described infra note 284. The
Xinhua news agency made an interesting metaphor after the Copenhagen
Conference concluded:
"More than 2,000 years ago, Mencius, a great thinker and
philosopher in ancient China, said 'Please extend the respect
of the aged in one's family to those of other families.' It is
hoped that every son and daughter in the world could
understand the Chinese son's concern and love for his old
mother, who still relies on a coal stove for heating in the depth
of winter."
China's point is that a large portion of the China's and the world's population
still lacks access to basic resources, including firewood for warmth, in line with
their basic equity premise of "one man, one barrel." Fu Yunwei & Guo Xinyu,
Developing Nations' Development Right Deserves Respect, XINHUA, Dec. 28,
2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/28/content
12712513.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
5 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, art. 8, 3.
54 See id. at art. 8.
5 The Marrakesh Accord, a supplementary rulebook to implement the Kyoto
Protocol, holds that states that do not fulfill their targets are required to deduct
1.3 times their excess emissions from the assigned amount in the next
commitment period. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001,
Report of the Conference of the Parties at 76, UN DOC FCCC/CP/2001/
13.Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2001).
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nisms: the carbon emissions trading market,5 6 joint implementa-
tion, and the clean development mechanism (CDM)." In true
international spirit, the CDM allows industrialized countries to
invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as
an alternative to more expensive domestic reductions.58 This
mechanism has particular appeal in China's development context,
yet China reports that "[c]urrent CDM projects approved
internationally (and domestically) such as HFC[-]23 and methane
projects, are not targeted to the sustainable development needs of
developing countries." 59
56 Precise records must be kept of any trades carried out on the carbon market.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, at art. 17. Today, registry systems track and
record transactions by Parties under the mechanisms. The UN Climate Change
Secretariat, based in Bonn, Germany, keeps an international transaction log to
verify that transactions consistent with Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, art. 12. "The mechanism known as 'joint
implementation', defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows a country
with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol
(Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-
reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B Party, each
equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting its
Kyoto target." Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/
mechanisms/joint implementation/items/ 1674.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
51 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, art. 12. "A CDM project activity might
involve, for example, a rural electrification project using solar panels or the
installation of more energy-efficient boilers. The mechanism stimulates
sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized
countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission reduction or
limitation targets." United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Clean Development Mechanism, UNFCCC. http://unfccc.int/kyoto protocol/
mechanisms/clean development mechanism/items/2718.php (last visited Nov.
15, 2010). Proceeds from CDM project activities also largely finance an
Adaptation Fund established to promote adaptation projects in developing Party
countries. See Lin Feng and Jason Buhi, Emissions Trading Across China:
Incorporating Hong Kong and Macau into an Urgently Needed Air Pollution
Control Regime Under 'One Country, Two Systems, 19 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. &POL'Y 123 (2009).
59 Jung Tae Yong et al., Asian Perspectives on Climate Regime Beyond 2012:
Concerns, Interests and Priorities, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES (2005), at 11, available at http: /enviroscope.
iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/ 169/attach/complete report.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2011).
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Diplomatically, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol divided the world
into two poles: developed countries, which had to accept cuts in
emissions, and the rest, with no binding commitments. While this
represents one possible manifestation of the CBDR principle, the
dichotomy boiled down to one inescapable fact for the U.S.: China,
then on pace to become the world's largest overall emitter of GHG,
was under no obligation to curb its emissions. Relying on
arguments saturated with PPP overtones, and due to tremendous
domestic political opposition largely premised on the fact that
Kyoto imposed no obligations upon emerging economies like
China, the U.S. opposed the Kyoto Protocol from the outset. With
their delegation still in Japan, the U.S. Senate passed a unanimous
95-0 declaration stating that the U.S. would not ratify any treaty
that did not include binding targets for developing nations or
"would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States." 60 Vice President Al Gore symbolically signed it in 1998,
but even he acknowledged that "we will not submit this agreement
for ratification until key developing nations participate in this
effort . . . [t]his is a global problem that will require a global
solution." 61 Despite the support of the executive branch, the Kyoto
Protocol was never submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification.
Nevertheless, "[t]he Kyoto Protocol is generally seen as an
important first step towards a truly global emission reduction
regime that will stabilize GHG emissions, and provides the
essential architecture for any future international agreement on
climate change." 62 The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and
60 A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Conditions for
the United States Becoming a Signatory to any International Agreement on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, S.Res.98, 105th Cong. (1997) (as passed by Senate, July 25,
1997), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong bills&docid f:sr98ats.txt.pdf (last visited
Nov. 15, 2010).
61 Clinton Hails Global Warming Pact But Early Senate Ratification is Unlikely,
CNN, ALL POLITICS (Dec. 11, 1997), http://www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/1997/12/1 /kyoto/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
62 The detailed rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol were adopted
at COP-7 in Marrakesh in November 2001, and are thus called the "Marrakesh
Accords." UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto
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finally entered into force in 2005.63 "Excluding the U.S., 192
Parties have ratified it to date." 64 However, the first commitment
period will expire in 2012. The Protocol will continue to be legally
binding but, in practice, if no further commitment periods are
agreed upon then countries will have no targets to cut their
emissions. A new international framework needs to be negotiated
and ratified by that time which can deliver the stringent emission
reductions the IPCC concludes are needed.
D. 2007: The Bali Roadmap and Action Plan
The negotiations on a new climate treaty began at a UN
meeting hosted by the Government of Indonesia. From December
3 to December 15, 2007, over 10,000 participants (including
representatives of over 180 countries, IGOs and NGOs) met at the
Bali International Convention Centre to plan for the post-Kyoto
era. 65 The two-week conference featured the 13th Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-13) and the 3rd Meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP-3). The second week of
negotiations was conducted at the ministerial-level. 66
That diplomacy culminated in the adoption of the so-called
Bali Road Map and Bali Action Plan,67 a series of "forward-
looking decisions" designed to achieve an effective post-Kyoto
protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). See also The Marrakesh
Accords and Marrakesh Declaration, available at http://unfccc.int/cop7/
documents/accords draft.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
63 Id.
64 UNFCCC, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, available at
http://unfccc.int/essential background/kyoto protocol/status of ratification/ite
ms/5524.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
65 UNFCCC, The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali,
http://unfccc.int/ meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).66 Id.
67 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Thirteenth Session, Bali, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Held in Bali From 3 to 15 December 2007,
at 3, UN DOC FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.I (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Action
Plan], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/copl3/eng/06aOl.
pdf#page=3 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
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Protocol climate agreement by 2009.68These demonstrate that the
Conference had several substantive achievements. Among the most
notable, the Kyoto Parties launched the Adaptation Fund, a
mechanism intended to finance diverse climate change projects
from constructing sea barriers to implementing early warning
systems for extreme meteorological events.69 Bali also contributed
to developing the scope and content of the Article 9 review of the
68 Rachmat Witoelar, The Bali Roadmap: Address to Closing Plenary by His
Excellency Mr. Rachmat Witoelar, President, UN Climate Change Conference,
Closing ofJoint High-Level Segment Bali, 15 December 2007, at 1, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_ 13/application/pdf/closestat
copl3 president.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
69 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Third Session, Bali Dec 3-15 2007, Report of the Conference of the
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Third
Session, Held in Bali From 3 to 15 December 2007, at 3, Decision I/CMP.3, UN
DOC FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cmp3/eng/09a0l.pdf#page=3 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2010). The Adaptation Fund was established to finance adaptation
projects in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol. According to the
World Bank, it has received USD$23.5mn through grants and the sale of
emission reduction certificates. See World Bank, Financial Status of the
Adaptation Fund Trust Fund (as of 30 November 2009), Nov. 30, 2009,
available at http://adaptation-fund.org/system/files/AF Financial Status
Report Jan%2031%202010%20%20-%2OFinal.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
The fund is administered by the Global Environment Facility, which
was established by donor governments to fund conservation projects in 1991.
The World Bank is its trustee, and a 16-member board, drawn from the
Conference of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol oversees it. The Adaptation Fund
Board comprises 16 members representing Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, taking
into account fair and balanced representation:
(a) Two representatives from each of the five United Nations regional
groups;
(b) One representative of the small island developing States;
(c) One representative of the least developed country Parties;
(d) Two other representatives from the Parties included in Annex I to
the Convention;
(e) Two other representatives from the Parties not included in Annex I
to the Convention.
See Bali Action Plan, supra note 67, Compensation.
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Kyoto Protocol,70 progress on technology transfer, and reducing
emissions from deforestation. 72
To facilitate the conference's major goal - progress toward
a new comprehensive climate agreement - the Parties adopted an
Action Plan that included the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention
(AWG-LCA). 73 The Parties charged it with a mandate to complete
and present the outcome of its work for adoption tothe COP-15 at
Copenhagen.74 In order to stimulate meaningful compromise, the
chair and vice-chair of the group were to alternate between one
Annex I Party and one non-Annex I Party, respectively. The
Action Plan avoided substantive goals, but contributed an
"indicative timetable for meetings" which scheduled seasonal
gatherings for the group through 2008.76 By following this outline,
the Parties were expected to draft a long-term, post-Kyoto Protocol
action plan for ratification at Copenhagen.
III. THE FINAL DAYS: DOMESTIC MEASURES AND
BILATERAL DIPLOMACY 2007-2009
Extensive rounds of ministerial-level international
conferences did take place in the two years between Bali and
70 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Third Session, Bali Dec 3-15 2007, Report of the Conference of the on
its Third Session, Held in Bali From 3 to 15 December 2007, at 19, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cmp3/eng/09a01.pdf#page=19 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2010).
71 See Bali Action Plan, supra note 67, at 12.
72 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the
Parties on Its Thirteenth Session, Bali, India, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Decision
2/CP.13, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries:
Approaches to Stimulate Action (Mar. 14, 2008), http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2007/copl3/eng/06a01.pdf#page=8 [Hereinafter Approaches to
Stimulate Action].
73 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1 /CP.13, supra note 67, at 2-13.
74 d
75 Id. atT5.
76 Id. at 7 and annex: Indicative Timetable for Meetings of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention in
2008.
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Copenhagen to resolve major issues and coordinate a negotiating
draft text.77Nonetheless, it appeared that the major players only
cemented their positions to relitigate them de novo at Copenhagen.
As international action is hostage to national events, political
developments in the major nations are crucial in interpreting what
happened during the Conference. This section discusses recent
national events within the U.S. and China that defined their
negotiating positions, as those two nations would come to occupy
the decisive roles.
A. The United States
U.S. President George W. Bush (2000-2008) openly
opposed the Kyoto Protocol during his administration based on the
exemption of large developing countries (specifically China),
perceived harm to the U.S. economy, and alleged uncertainties in
the scientific evidence.78 He finally acknowledged that climate
7 The second session of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 2) and the second part of the fifth
session of the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 5) took place from June 2-13, 2008,
in Bonn, Germany. The AWG-LCA 3 and AWG-KP 6 met at Accra, Ghana
from August 21-27, 2008. The Fourteenth UN Climate Change Conference of
the Parties (COP-14) was held in Poznan from December 1-12, 2008,
culminating in developing the Adaptation Fund and a ministerial round table on
a shared vision on long-term cooperative action on climate change. Thereafter,
the AWG-KP 7 and AWG-LCA 5 met at Bonn in March 2009; the AWG-KP 8
and AWG-LCA 6 met at Bonn in June 2009; and informal intercessional
consultations of the two groups met at Bonn August 10-14, 2009. The AWG-KP
9 and AWG-LCA 7 met soon thereafter in Bangkok, Thailand, and resumed in
Barcelona, Spain. Both groups met to conclude their work at the COP-15, in
Copenhagen. Information on all of these meetings is available through the
UNFCCC web site, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/ad hoc working
groups/Ica/items/4918.php (Jan. 4, 2011).
78 President George W. Bush acknowledged that human activity contributes to
global warming in Denmark as he prepared to debate climate change with other
G8 leaders at a 2005 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland. Sean Clarke, Bush
Acknowledges 'Problem' of Global Warming, GUARDIAN, July 6, 2005,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/jul/06/usnews.
development.
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change is an anthropomorphic problem in his second term.79
Publicly, President Bush proposed that all nations adopt voluntary
or aspirational domestic goals to reduce overall emissions - a
position designed to circumvent the legalities of the Kyoto
Protocol.80 Privately, and in response to a 2007 invitation by
China, the U.S. clandestinely sent a series of Congressional envoys
to China to secure a bilateral action plan for combating climate
change.8 'That effort continued into the next administration. 82
The November 2008 election of Barack Obama to the
American Presidency brought new optimism. President Obama
firmly acknowledged climate change as an "epochal, man-made
threat to the planet" during his campaign.83 Two events in the first
year of his Presidency gave hope, at long last, to concerned
climatologists: first, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) complied with a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court
by agreeing to regulate six different GHGs; second, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security
Act.
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court examined global warming
for the first time and rebuked the Bush Administration's EPA for
refusing to regulate GHG emissions, holding that the EPA violated
the Clean Air Act by declining to regulate new-vehicle emissions
standards. 84 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority in
79
80 Caren Bohan, Bush: Kyoto Approach on Climate is 'Bad Policy,' REUTERS,
Oct. 15, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN 15378719
20071015 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
8 Suzanne Goldenberg, China and US Held Secret Talks on Climate Change
Deal, GUARDIAN, May 18, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2009/may/18/secret-us-china-emissions-talks.
82 Id.
8 Council on Foreign Relations, The Candidates on Climate Change (Sept. 11,
2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/14765/.
84 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The 5-4 split reinforced the
division on the Supreme Court, with its four liberal members in the majority and
its four most conservative members dissenting. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
characteristically provided the swing vote, as he sided with John Paul Stevens
(who authored the majority opinion), Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and David H. Souter against Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Samuel Alito Jr.,
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency et al., reasoning that the "EPA has offered no
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse
gases cause or contribute to climate change."85 On December 7,
2009, the EPA responded by publishing findings that GHG
emissions do threaten the public health and welfare of the
American people. 86 While the findings do not impose any emission
reduction requirements, they allow the EPA to finalize new vehicle
emissions standards for six pollutants. EPA Administrator Lisa P.
Jackson hailed the news by saying "[t]hese long-overdue findings
cement 2009's place in history as the year when the United States
Government began addressing the challenge of greenhouse-gas
pollution and seizing the opportunity of clean-energy reform."88
Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, hoped that the EPA decision would increase pressure
on Congress to take GHG reducing measures during and after the
Conference. 89
The U.S. House had already acted, surprising many by
passing the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA) by
a 219-212 vote on June 27, 2009. 901f passed by the Senate,91 the
" Id. at 534.
16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act, Federal
Register/ Vol. 74, No. 239, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://edocket.access.
gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-29537.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
8 Those six newly regulated pollutants are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. Id. at 3.
8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public
Health and the Environment, Office of Air and Radiation (Dec. 07, 2009),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7ebdf4d0b217978b852573590040443
a/08dl Ia45 1131bca585257685005bf252!OpenDocument.
89 Andrew Ward, Kerry Plays Central Role in Crucial Deal, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/al8b6cbc-ea7a-1lde-
a9f5-00l44feab49a.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
90 American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-Ilhr2454pcs/pdf/BILLS-111hr2454
pcs.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
91 The House of Representatives approved the bill by a 219-212 vote, but the bill
still requires 60 votes in the Senate and the President's signature to become law.
Powerful interest groups are aligned against it, including the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and organizations
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ACESA would put a price on GHG emissions,92 mandate that 20%
of America's electricity come from renewable sources by 2020,93
provide funding for the preservation of tropical forests around the
world,94 and impose a goal of reducing overall GHG emissions by
20% from 2005 levels by the year 2020 and 83% by mid-century. 95
However, the ACESA would also impose tariffs (called
"international reserve allowances") on goods imported from
countries that do not abide by similar emissions restrictions -
obviously intended to address China - that could be viewed as
protectionism and provoke a trade war.96
B. The People's Republic of China
Prior to 2004, Chinese leaders obsessed about their
country's economic development and rarely spoke the phrase
representing airlines, oil producers and mining companies. The 17 percent figure
passed by the House and contained in the Senate's draft Waxman-Markey Bill is
lower than the 20 percent cut featured in rival Senate Bill. However, that bill
preferred to use command and control techniques to a cap-and-trade system.
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733,,11 th Cong. (sponsored
by Sen. John F. Sen Kerry [MA], September 30, 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- 1I1sl 733rs/pdf/BILLS- 1I1sl 733rs.pdf;
Editorial, The Senate Climate Bill, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/09/30/AR2009093004242.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
92 H.R. 2454, supra note 90 at Title VII - Global Warming Pollution Reduction
Program: Part A - Global Warming Pollution Reduction Goals and Targets, §§
701-735.
93 H.R. 2454, supra note 90 at Title 1--Clean Energy, § 103, Federal Renewable
Energy Purchases.
94 H.R. 2454, supra note 90 at Title VII-Global Warming Reduction Program,
Part E-Supplemental Emissions Reductions from Reduced Deforestation, §§
751-756.
9 H.R. 2454, supra note 90 at Title VII-Global Warming Pollution Reduction
Program: Part A - Global Warming Pollution Reduction Goals and Targets,
§702.
96 H.R. 2454, supra note 90 at Title IV-Transitioning to a Clean Energy
Economy, Part F - Ensuring Real Reductions in Industrial Emissions, § 768
International Reserve Allowance Program.
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"climate change." 97 Jiang Zemin, President of China from 1993-
2003, stressed the development of the Chinese economy and,
correspondingly, placed a low priority on environmentalism.98
President Hu Jintao and his Premier Wen Jiabao (2004-Present)
entered office with ambition to create a more "Harmonious
Society," a political platform ostensibly intended to level the
inequities of raw Chinese capitalism. 99 They moved to address
environmental issues, recognizing that environmental degradation
generally and climate change specifically are threats to domestic
economic and political stability.100 Thus, Beijing's agenda for
climate change has shifted as far as Washington's in recent years.
In 2007, noting that the UNFCCC expects all nations to
formulate, publish and implement national mitigation programs,'o0
China adopted a National Climate Change Program (CNCCP)
9 Alex Pasternack, Are China and U.S. Really Headed for a Copenhagen
Deadlock?, Treehugger.com (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.treehugger.
com/files/2009/09/copenhagen-prospects-us-china-climate-deal.php.
98 See generally Larry Cat5 Backer, The Rule Of Law, The Chinese Communist
Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The Three Represents),
Socialist Rule Of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16 TRANSNT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2006).
99 "Since the Sixteenth National Congress, the Central Committee of the Party
has followed the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought
of Three Represents and, by pooling the wisdom of the whole Party to meet new
requirements of development, formulated the Scientific Outlook on
Development, which puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and
sustainable development." Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party,
General Program, T7, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
10/25/content 6944738.htm (last visited Jan 5, 2011).
100 There are now more than 2,500 environmental NGOs in China, and the
government estimates that 3.76 million citizens participated in over 74,000
environmentally related protests. Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy
and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1805 (2008); Srini Sitaraman,
Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and
Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 267, 277 (2007); Abigail Jahiel, The Organization of Environmental
Protection in China, THE CHINA QUARTERLY, No. 156 at 771(1998), available
at http://ww.jstor.org/pss/656124; Edward Cody, China Grows More Wary
over Rash of Protests, WASH. PosT, Aug. 10, 2005 at All, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/09/AR2005080901323.html.
101 UNFCCC, supra note 28, at art. 4(l)(b).
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outlining basic principles, policy objectives and active measures to
address climate change through 2010.102 As a result of these
measures, China claims to have eliminated the inefficient produc-
tion of 60 million tons of iron, 43 million tons of steel, 140 million
tons of cement and 65 million tons of coke. 103 China further
estimates that its energy consumption per unit of GDP has dropped
13 percent from the 2005 level: the equivalent to reducing 800
million tons of carbon dioxide.' 04
In 2008, the State Environmental Protection Administration
(SEPA) was upgraded to full ministry status.105 Then, on
September 22, 2009, Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a
speech to the UN General Assembly indicating that China was
seriously preparing for Copenhagen.' 0 6 He recalled the CNCCP
and announced that China would unilaterally cut its "carbon
intensity" - the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of gross
domestic product - per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent from 2005
levels by 2020.107 He also announced three other measures:
Second, we will vigorously develop renewable
energy and nuclear energy. We will endeavor to
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary
energy consumption to around 15 percent by 2020.
Third, we will energetically increase forest carbon
- (inaudible) - we will endeavor to increase
forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest
stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020
from the 2005 levels. Fourth, we will step up our
102 China's National Climate Change Programme, June 2007, available at
en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/P020070604561191006823.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2010).
103 Yu Zhixiao, China Plays Key Role Making Copenhagen Talks Successful,
XINHUA (Dec. 25, 2009), http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/ t648276.htm.
104 Id.
105 Highlights: China Launches Sweeping Institutional Restricting of
Government, XINHUA (Mar. 11, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
03/11/content 7765398.htm.
1o6 Hu Jintao's Speech on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html.
107 Id.
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efforts to develop green economy, low carbon
economy and - (inaudible) - economy and
enhance research, development and dissemination
of climate-friendly technologies. 08
Though not mentioned during this speech, China's largest GHG
mitigation measure is, frankly, its population policy. China is the
world's most populous nation, and introduced its "One-Child"
family planning policy in the late 1970s when confronted with a
population explosion. 109 It was imposed to alleviate poverty and
increase the per capita standard of living by allowing for the
supply of public services to catch up to demand.!l0 Chinese
officials now note environmental side-benefits, linking population
size to GHG emissions at Copenhagen. In the first week of the
meeting, Zhao Baige, Vice Minister of the National Population and
Family Planning Commission, asserted "[lt]here is a strong
correlation between population growth and climate change."' She
also acknowledged that the policies have some mixed
consequences, notably an uneven sex ratio.112 "I'm not saying that
what we have done is 100 percent right, but I'm sure we are going
in the right direction and now 1.3 billion people have
benefited."113Official figures showed the country's birth rate went
down from more than 1.8 percent in 1978 to around 1.2 percent in
2007, resulting in an estimated 400 million fewer births. "Such a
decline in population growth converts into a reduction of 1.83
billion tons of carbon dioxide emission in China per annum at
present." 1 14
08 Id.
109 Embassy of the PRC in the United States of America, China's Population
Policy Helps Slow Global Warming, Says Official, XINHUA (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://us.chineseembassy.org/eng/zt/t633038.htm [hereinafter China's
Population Policy].
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 id
113 Id.; Andrew C. Revkin, The Missing 'P' Word in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/the-missing-p-
word-in-climate-talks/.
114China's Population Policy, supra note 109.
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While there is no possibility that population control
measures will appear in any foreseeable international agreement
for obvious political reasons, there is no denying the mitigating
effect that this policy has had on Chinese GHG emissions. That
sacrifice should be acknowledged, even though the per-capita
emission of carbon dioxide in China is estimated as less than half
of that in Britain and one-fifth of that in the United States." 5
C. Bilateral and Multinational Events in the Final Days
Even after President Obama's early breakthroughs and
President Hu's announcement of a carbon intensity target, the
prospects for a deal at Copenhagen were not optimistic. However,
several important bilateral breakthroughs occurred in the past few
years that do not receive enough heralding.
Most notably, in 2006 Presidents George W. Bush and Hu
Jintao created a "Strategic Economic Dialogue" (SED) between the
U.S. and China to ensure that leaders of the two countries can have
a forum for discussing important bilateral issues,'6so as "to
promote understanding, expand common ground, reduce differ-
ences, and develop solutions to common problems."' 7 As noted,
the two nations began a secretive climate change dialog in 2007,11'
and at the fourth SED meeting on June 18, 2008, the two nations
took a groundbreaking bilateral step by adopting a "Framework for
Ten-Year Cooperation on Energy and Environment," designed to
facilitate practical cooperation in all areas of energy and the
environment. 119 It includes five action plans,120 an "EcoPartner-
11i Id.
116 Fact Sheet HP-107, Creation of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic
Dialogue, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/hpl07.htm.
117 US-China Joint Statement, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-
china-joint-statement.
118 Goldenberg, China and US Held Secret Talks, supra note 81.
119 Joint Fact Sheet HP-1311, U.S. - China Joint Fact Sheet: Ten Year Energy
and Environment Cooperation (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/hpl311.htm.
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ship" initiative designed to promote sub-national cooperation and
private-public partnerships to meet energy/environmental goals,121
and establishes a Joint Working Group composed of officials at the
Assistant-Secretary level for the U.S. and the Director General
level for China. 122 In July 2009, the two sides adopted a
"Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on
Climate Change, Energy and Environment" noting that:
Cooperation on climate change, clean and efficient
energy and environmental protection can serve as a
pillar of the bilateral relationship, build mutual trust
and respect, and lay the foundation for constructive
engagement between the United States and China
for years to come, while also contributing to
multilateral cooperation.123
Indeed, modern economics and environmentalism of scale are
entwined. European Commission President Jose Barroso predicted
that the outcome at Copenhagen hinged upon an agreement being
outlined at the G-20 talks in Pittsburgh held over September 24
120 The five action plans are for (1) Cooperation and Information Sharing on the
Goals of Clean, Efficient and Secure Electricity Production and Transmission;
(2) Clean Water; (3) Clean Air; (4) Clean and Efficient Transportation; and (5)
Conservation of Forests and Wetlands Ecosystems. Id
121 Seven initial EcoPartnerships were announced: (1) Energy Future Holdings
Corp. and China Huadian Corporation; (2) Denver, Colorado, USA, Ford Motor
Company and Chongqing, China, Changan Auto Group Corporation; (3)
Wichita, Kansas, USA and Wuxi, Jiangsu, China; (4) Floating Windfarms
Corporation and Tangshan Caofeidian New Development Area, Hebei, China;
(5) Port of Seattle, Washington, USA and Dalian Port Corporation, Liaoning,
China; (6) Greensburg, Kansas, USA and Mianzhu, Sichuan, China; and (7)
Tulane University and East China Normal University (ECNU). Id.
122The JWG is co-chaired by the Department of State and Department of Energy
on the U.S. side, and by the National Development and Reform Commission on
the Chinese side. Id.
123 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman,
U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate
Change, Energy and the Environment (July 28, 2009),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126592.htm.
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and 25, 2009. 12 Honoring shifts in global diplomatic and
economic strength, the G7 was permanently replaced as an inter-
national forum for economic policy by the much broader G-20
including China, Brazil, India and other fast-developing countries
in 2009.125 President Obama co-chaired a meeting of the G-20's
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, but no climate
breakthrough was announced. 126Less than one month later,
President Obama paid a three-day visit to China resulting in a
"U.S.-China Joint Statement" highlighting several areas of bilateral
cooperation, but once again no climate agreement followed.127
Rather, on the eve of the Conference, the U.S. fired a warning shot
across China's bow - thereby also reminding the developing world
of a tactical weapon at its disposal - by imposing tariffs on imports
of Chinese automobile and truck tires.128 Chinese leaders
denounced the move and threatened to retaliate with barriers
against American chicken. 29
124 "I think we need a strong commitment from the G20 for success to a global
deal in Copenhagen, and also to keep our commitments regarding the
Millennium Development Goals." Jos6 Barroso, SPEECH/09/160, The G 20 - A
Unique Opportunity (Mar. 31, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=SPEECH/09/160&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
&guiLanguage en.
125 For over three decades the main economic group was the Group of 7: the
U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. Russia was gradually
added in the 1990's to help integrate it with the West. Today the G-20 is made
up of the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries including
the G-8 plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey.G-20 Presidency,
What is the G-20, http://www.g20.org/about what is-g20.aspx (last visited Jan
5,2011).
126 Edmund L. Andrews, In New World Order, Global Forum Expands
Permanently, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
09/25/world/25summit.html.
127 U.S. White House Press Secretary, US-China Joint Statement (Nov. 17,
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement.
128 The state visit took place from November 15 to 18, 2009. Id.
129 Andrews, supra note 126.
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D. The Negotiating Positions
And so the two nations went to Copenhagen, suspicious
and defensive yet ostensibly committed to mapping out a plan for
combating climate change from 2012 to 2020. Each side arrived
with clearly defined goals. Unfortunately, that refinement seemed
to be about all the two years of diplomacy since Bali had achieved.
As President Obama would acknowledge, three key pillars
divided the camps: mitigation targets, transparency, and finance.130
The United States sought to address its classic objections and
demanded that developing countries accept GHG emissions
reductions subject to "transparent" external monitoring for
compliance verification. To entice agreement, the U.S. knew that it
could offer financial assistance as an incentive. However, this
approach would carry little diplomatic weight with China who was
neither asking for nor likely to receive foreign aid.131 As Todd
Stern, the leader of the U.S. delegation stated, "I do not envision
public funds, certainly not from the U.S. going to China." 132 In the
alterative, the U.S. could also have offered deeper emissions cuts
from it and its allies to encourage agreement. The EU, for example,
indicated that it was willing to raise its emissions-cutting target
from 20% off 1990 levels to 30% if other countries agreed to
130 "Throughout the day we worked with many countries to establish a new
consensus around these three points, a consensus that will serve as a foundation
for global action to confront the threat of climate change for years to come."
U.S. White House Press Release, Remarks by the President During Press
Availability in Copenhagen (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-during-press-availability-copenhagen.
China Stands as Constructive Player in Copenhagen, XINHUA (Dec. 26,
2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/26/content 12706368.htm.
132 "The change of tone was stark. As noted, for nearly a year prior to the
Copenhagen Conference many developed countries have taken pains to praise
China lavishly in public. Mr Stern told a conference this year: 'China is doing a
lot [on cutting emissions], but doesn't get credit for it, and should.' That was the
tactic before the talks, as the US and others sought to bring a wary Beijing to the
negotiating table." Fiona Harvey, et al., Rich Nations Step Up Pressure on
Beijing, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/726eblbc-
e8e2-1I de-a756-00l44feab49a.html.
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comparable targets. 133Finally, if worse came to worst, the U.S.
could resort to more punishing methods to pressure China: i.e., by
threatening the types of border adjustments imposed days before
and looming in the ACESA.
The Chinese came to the table with ambitious promises of
GHG mitigation, but proud of its own contextual situation. China
is trying to balance environmental protection with the goals of
economic development and massive poverty alleviation.134Along
with industrialization, the rate of extreme poverty in China
declined from a high of 84% in 1981 to just 16% in 2005.Thus,
China does not conceptualize the GHG emission issue in the same
zero-sum terms employed by Western politicians. This is
especially true when considering that:
For instance, the Kyoto Protocol often ignores the unique situation
of export-driven economies like China, where 23% of the total
carbon dioxide emissions were accrued by export goods in 2004.
Significantly, the bulk of GHG emissions of export-driven
economies result from manufacturing goods intended for the
consumption of outside countries . . . [For true climate justice]
[o]ne would need to determine the percentage of GHG emissions
from exported goods and where such goods are exported in order
to apportion targets. 135
Even under this "unjust" accounting method, China
still has significantly lower per capita carbon
133 Id. For a detailed synopsis of the European negotiating position, see
European Commission Position Paper, Towards a Comprehensive Climate
Agreement in Copenhagen, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/
pdf/future action/communication.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
134 "The decline occurred in both rural and urban areas: the rural poverty rate fell
from 94 to 26 per cent and the urban poverty rate fell from 45 to less than 2 per
cent during this period." United Nations Report, Poverty: The Official Numbers,
Chapter 2, pg. 12, available at www.un.org/esa/socdev/
rwss/docs/2010/chapter2.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
13 Tan Kai Liang, From Kyoto to Post-2012: The Implications of Engaging
China for Environmental Norms and Justice, 17 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 33, 39
(2009).
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emissions than citizens of developed countries. 136In
view of these realities, China frequently asserts the
CBDR principle to put the onus on the developed
world. 137 China entered Copenhagen wanting the
developed countries to agree to emissions cuts of
40% below 1990 levels by 2020. However, they
opposed the institutionalization of a global target
advocated by the developed countries.1 39 Although
such a goal would not impose specific limits on
China, the Chinese nonetheless prophesy that a
worldwide cap might be invoked to force them into
steep national emissions targets at a later date.140
China also wanted developed countries to give developing
countries billions of dollars in assistance aid to cope with the
effects of climate change. 141 In advocating this position, the
Chinese aligned themselves with the so-called "Group of 77." In
fact composed of 130 diverse countries, it is a coalition meant to
amplify the collective bargaining power of most nations of the
136 LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 233 (2006).
137 China's pre-Conference position paper prominently cites the CBDR and
Sustainable Development principles but does not mention the PPP. National
Development and Reform Commission, People's Republic of China, China's
Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, May 20, 2009,
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_280382.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2010).
s
38 Id.
139 At least one draft version included a collective agreement among all nations
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2050 - with developed nations
pledging as a bloc to reduce emissions by 80% over the same period - that did
not make the final cut. China's Thing about Numbers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 30,
2009, available at http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.
cfm?story id 15179774 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
140 Fiona Harvey, The Copenhagen Positioning of China and India - Not Always
What it Seems, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, available at http://blogs.
ft.com/energy-source/2009/11/03/the-copenhagen-positioning-of-china-and-
india-not-always-what-it-seems/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
141 Id
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world. 142 It is, by its nature, the opposite of monolithic. "Its richest
members are 50 times as wealthy on a per-capita basis as its
poorest ones, but they unite to take advantage of the far greater
negotiating power and resources of countries like China, India and
Brazil. All of this makes a constructive position very difficult to
establish; often, the easiest thing to agree on is to obstruct
action."1 43In addition to financial assistance,144 the G77 sought
adherence to the binding principles espoused in the Kyoto Protocol
and the limiting of global temperatures to less than 20C. 145China
has built diplomatic authority with many of the G77 countries
because of its extensive investments in Africa and Latin America,
often involving lucrative deals to bring oil and minerals home.146
Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the two years since
Bali, combined with these diverse and intractable viewpoints, led
most observers to give up on the idea that a legally binding treaty
could be signed at Copenhagen months before the Conference
began. 147 Hopes refocused around a "declaration" that could
become legally binding at a future date.148
142 John M. Broder, Poor and Emerging States Stall Climate Negotiations, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/science/earth/
17climate.html (quoting Michael A. Levi, a climate change specialist at the
Council on Foreign Relations attending the Copenhagen Conference).
143 Id.
144 In one of the most extreme manifestations of this demand, Bolivian President
Evo Morales proposed that rich countries should be hailed before an
"International Climate Change Court" to pay what he characterizes as climate
"reparations." John Vidal, Evo Morales Stuns Copenhagen with demand to Limit
Temperature Rise to IC, GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/environment/2009/dec/ 16/evo-morales-hugo-chavez.
145 Darren Samuelsohn et al., Copenhagen Talks Enter Final Phase, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/14/14climatewire-
copenhagen-talks-enter-fmal-phase-43362.html.
146 Jason Buhi, Un Negocio de China: Building upon the Santiago Principles to
form an Effective International Approach to Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation,
31 HONG KONG L. J. 1, 197, 205 (2009).
147 Fiona Harvey, et al., Copenhagen: A Discordant Accord, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8fb70c48-ed9b-1lde-bal2-00144
feab49a.html.
148id
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IV. THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE: DAY BY DAY
The Copenhagen Conference drew representatives from
192 countries that began arriving in Denmark in time to begin the
proceedings on December 6, 2009. As host nation, Denmark
served as the conference chair and organizer. The New York
Times offered an intimate portrait of the temporary diplomatic row
created at the Bella Center:
Consider that real estate maxim: location, location,
location. So it went with delegation offices in the
Bella Center. Major countries secured office space
in the C wing, areas defined by particle board walls
and temporary doors that have been emblazoned
with the nation's identity. Britain's office is
decorated with photos of Prime Minister Gordon
Brown; a star-studded national seal adorns Brazil's
office. The United States has maintained separate
but adjoining offices for the House, the Senate and
the executive branch. The offices of traditional
friends like Britain, France and Australia are
nearby. But good luck finding China's. China, a
negotiating powerhouse here and the world's
biggest emitter, would certainly not be found
anywhere near the United States (the No. 2 emitter),
with which it locked horns during the talks. It
occupies two tiny rooms in the last row of office
space, which also includes the African Union,
Serbia, Montenegro and Russia. 149
Within the G77, larger countries like Brazil and China had "well-
appointed headquarters" in a central part of the Bella Center, while
149 Elisabeth Rosenthal, An Alphabet Soup of Causes and Clauses, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/ 19
notebook.html.
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the G77's remote office featured two "Spartan" rooms equipped
with only two computers. 50
While the siege mentality apparent between the American
and Chinese delegations correctly symbolized their positions on
the issues, the world sat in hope that the gulf could be bridged.
Both nations often represent the most recalcitrant major player
within their respective blocs and, as the old adage goes, "keep your
friends close, but your enemies closer." New York Times
columnist Thomas Freidman stated:
In this case, I'm just not sure if a deal is really
possible. There's a lot of circles here, circles within
circles, but the circle that's in the middle of the
whole thing has the United States and China. And
these two powers, very wary of each other, each
desperate not to have a deal here that will give
strategic and economic advantage to the other.'51
The following is a brief narrative interpretation of the
Conference constructed from official statements, draft texts and
news reports. It would be impossible to fully represent every event
from the perspective of all participants, so this section focuses on
the two nations receiving the most attention, acclaim and blame.
Indeed, the two keys to the deal - a dramatic offer of $100 billion
in aid from the industrialized nations to poorer countries, and a
universal verification system to which all countries submit - were
brokered by the U.S. and China. It becomes evident that the
Conference proceeded like a roller coaster track that, for a while,
seemed would unravel. On the evening of Friday, December 18 th,
2009 (the proverbial 1 1th hour of the 12-day summit) negotiators
dramatically struck a deal.
150 Broder, supra note 142.
15
'New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman made these statements to
CBS's "The Early Show" on Friday Dec. 18, 2009. Daniel Carty, Friedman:
Copenhagen a U.S.-China Power Struggle, CBS NEWS, Dec. 18, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543 162-5994673-503543.html.
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A. The First Week
DAY 1: Monday, December 7, 2009
The COP-15 and MOP-5 opened at 10am on Monday,
December 7, 2009.152 The opening ceremonies began with a
cultural segment offered by the Host Government of
Denmark.153No sooner had those ceremonies ended than the
Conference faced its first challenge, as the Lesotho delegation
directed the Conference toward financial discussions.154 The EU
responded later in the week by tabling a pledge of 2.4 billion Euros
per year from 2010 to 2012 for adaptation efforts in the poorest
countries, but the announcement was met with criticism. 155 The
G77 characterized the pledge as "insignificant" and, together with
China, demanded increased long-term financing. 156Alternative
proposals from the G77 called for either $400 billion annually,' 5 7
or five percent of the total GNP of developed nations. 1 Such
demands are politically unrealistic in the current economic
environment, so gridlock quickly followed the Lesotho
submission.
152 Note to Correspondents No. 3, Fifteenth Sess. of the Conf. of the parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec. 5, 2009),
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/copl5 note
correspondents no3.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
153 Id.
154 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Earth
Negotiations Bulletin: Copenhagen Highlights, (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.iisd.ca/voll2/enbl2449e.html.
155 Nanet Poulsen, EU Putting More Money on the Table, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://www.e-javssour.net/en/node/3659 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2010); Idowu Sowunmi, G77 Rejects EU's 7.2bn Euros for Climate
Funding, ALL AFRICA, Dec. 12, 2009,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200912120003.html.
156 Sowunmi, supra note 155.
157 EU Climate Cash Pledge 'Not Enough' Say Small Nations, BBC NEWS, Dec.
11, 2009,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8408821.stm.
15s Sudanese Ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping, chair of the G77, insisted on this
target. Henry Lutaaya, Developing Countries Set Tougher Targets, CLIMATE
CHANGE MEDIA PARTNERSHIP, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://www.climatemediapartnership.org/reporting/stories/developing-countries-
set-tougher-targets.
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DAY 2: Tuesday December 8 th, 2009
On the second day, a leaked version of a draft agreement
known as the "Danish text" poisoned the Conference, evoking an
angry reaction from the developing nations. They alleged that
developed countries excluded them altogether and drafted an
accord favorable to their position.1 59 The existence of the text was
first revealed by London's Guardian newspaper:
The agreement, leaked to the Guardian, is a
departure from the Kyoto protocol's principle that
rich nations, which have emitted the bulk of the
C02, should take on firm and binding commitments
to reduce greenhouse gases, while poorer nations
were not compelled to act. The draft hands effective
control of climate change finance to the World
Bank; would abandon the Kyoto protocol - the only
legally binding treaty that the world has on
emissions reductions; and would make any money
to help poor countries adapt to climate change
dependent on them taking a range of actions.160
The document was also interpreted as setting unequal limits on per
capita carbon emissions for developed and developing countries,
allowing people in rich countries to emit nearly twice as much as
people in developing countries in the year 2050.161 Another
provision of the text referred to a "peak" year for carbon emissions
159 "It's an incredibly imbalanced text intended to subvert, absolutely and
completely, two years of negotiations. It does not recognize the proposals and
the voice of developing countries," said Lumumba StanislausDia Ping, the
Sudanese ambassador and de facto voice of the G77. Hilary Whiteman, Poor
Nations' Fury Over Leaked Climate Text, CNN, available at http://www.
cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/12/09/danish.draft.climate.text.0850/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2010).
160 John Vidal, Copenhagen Climate Summit in Disarray After 'Danish Text'
Leak, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-disarray-
danish-text. Some speculate that the Chinese delegation was the source of the
leak. See China's Thing about Numbers, supra note 139.
161 Vidal, supra note 160.
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from developing countries, precisely what China was determined
to oppose:
The developing countries' individual mitigation
action could in aggregate yield a [Y percent]
deviation in [2020] from business as usual and
yielding their collective emissions peak before
[20XX] and decline thereafter.' 62
Chinese negotiator Su Wei asserted "it is too early to talk about a
peak concentration year for developing countries," 16 3 but took
greater offense to passages proposing international measurement,
reporting and verification of developing country actions.' 64
Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC,
responded quickly to play down the document's importance,
stating "[lt]his was an informal paper ahead of the conference given
to a number of people for the purposes of consultations. The only
formal texts in the U.N. process are the ones tabled by the Chairs
of this Copenhagen conference at the behest of the Parties."' 65 In
response, smaller nations weighed a walk-out, while a draft accord
written by the BASIC countries - Brazil, South Africa, India and
China - was released that contrasted sharply with one put together
by Denmark. 166 A moment of clarity arrived later in the day, when
the WMO timely released a new analysis concluding that the
decade of the 2000's is "likely the warmest decade in the modern
record, dating back 150 years." 167
162 It was expected that the figures represented by "X" and "Y" would be added
during the course of negotiations. Whiteman, supra note 160. (Poor nations'
fury over leaked climate text)
163 "Climate Talks in Disarray Over 'Danish text,"' XINHUA, Dec. 10, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/2009-12/10/
content 9150985.htm.
164 id
165 Whiteman, supra note 159.
166 James Kanter, Smaller Nations Weigh Power of the Walkout, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/world/europe/09iht-
walkout.html.
167 John Pickrell, Global Warming 'Marches On'; Past Decade Hottest Known,
NAT. GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://news.
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DAY 3: Wednesday, December 9, 2009
The island nation of Tuvalu led a walkout in response to
the Danish Text controversy and the proposal of a 20C limit on
global temperature increase, forcing negotiations to stall for
several hours. 168 Tuvalu and the faction known as the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS) sought stronger regulations than the
Danish text called for. They envisioned strengthening the Kyoto
Protocol, 169 and insisting upon a cap at 1.5'C instead.o70Sudanese
diplomat Lumumba Di-Aping, voice of the G77, asserted that the
2'C target will "result in massive devastation to Africa and small
island states."' 7 1
Day 4: Thursday, December 10, 2009
Two senior U.S. officials arrived bringing hope that the
U.S. is ready to constructively participate as well as confirming
their bottom line. EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson detailed many
measures that the Obama Administration took to cut U.S. GHG
emissions, telling the Conference, "[w]e are seeking robust
engagement with all of our partners around the world." But two
hours later, the U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd
Stern, made clear that the U.S. considers carbon reductions by
nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/12/091208-copenhagen-climate-conference-
global-warming-climategate.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010); see also Andrew
C. Revkin, et al., No Slowdown of Global Warming, Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/science/earth/09climate.
html?_ r2&hp; Press Release No.869, 2000 2009: The Warmest Decade,
WMO, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press releases/pr
869 en.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
68 John Vidal, Copenhagen Talks Break Down as Developing Nations Split over
'Tuvalu' Protocol, GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/09/copenhagen-tuvalu-
protocol-split.
169 John Vidal, Vulnerable Nations at Copenhagen Summit Reject 2C Target,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/ 10/copenhagen-climate-
change.
170 id
171 John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations' Climate Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/
earth/ 9climate.html.
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China and other major developing countries as "a core part of this
negotiation."' 172  Ambassador Yu Qingtai, China's Special
Representative for Climate Change, responded by suggesting that
the U.S. perform some "deep soul-searching."' 7 3 These ongoing
exchanges, to be repeated many more times, symbolically pit the
CBDR and PPP principles against each other in spirit if not by
name.
DAYS 5-7: Weekend of 11 - 13 December 2009
The remainder of the first week followed a similar path:
draft agreements bandied about followed by varying degrees of
indignation. The EU responded to Lesotho's financing challenge
by pledging 2.4 billion Euros per year from 2010 to 2012 for
adaptation efforts in the poorest countries, only to be met with
criticism.174 Both sides returned to their touchstones, with the U.S.
asserting the right to impose border adjustments in a draft version
of a deal, while powerful emerging economies moved to strike. 175
B. The Second Week
Tensions continued to mount at the beginning of the second
week, as the negotiations became more fevered and urgent.
DAY 8: Monday, 14 December 2009
The African countries walked-out of the negotiations on
Monday, kicking off the second week and forcing a five-hour
172 Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Pushes for Emissions Cuts from China, Developing
Nations, WASH. PosT, Dec. 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/09/AR2009120904596.html.
173[d
174 Nanet Poulsen, EU Putting More Money on the Table, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 11, 2009; Idowu Sowunmi, G77 Rejects EU's 7.2bn Euros for Climate
Funding, ALLAFRICA, Dec. 12, 2009, available at http://
allafrica.com/stories/200912120003.html.
175 REUTERS, Obama Notifies Congress of Asia-Pacific Trade Pact Intentions,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/
business/global/16trade.html.
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suspension of the talks.176 They protested in favor of the
paramountcy of continuing the Kyoto Protocol's binding emissions
caps for developed countries. 177 China, which also considers this
issue vital, echoed African concerns when He Yafei, the Chinese
Vice-Foreign Minister, demanded "as a matter of principle" that
Kyoto's successor incorporate the principles enshrined in the
Kyoto Protocol.17 8 But, China also repeated its refusal to submit to
binding caps or international emissions monitoring.'7 9
The developed countries pushed back in the afternoon by
continuing the issue of border adjustments raised over the
weekend, and possible taxes on aviation and shipping fuel were
discussed. 180 This met with a stern rebuke, "[w]e are totally against
[border adjustments] - totally against it," from Jairam Ramesh,
India's chief negotiator." In a more positive development, U.S.
Energy Secretary Steven Chu promised a $350 million fund for the
development of new clean energy technologies, 182 an offering
176 The walkout was led by the Sudanese diplomat Lumumba Stanislaus Di-
Aping, saying the developed nations' offer of $10 billion in "quick-start"
financing after completion of a deal was wholly inadequate. He had the support
of China and India. See Urmi A. Goswami, Africa Calls Rich Nations' Bluff
ECONOMIC TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/Africa-calls-rich-
nations-bluff/articleshow/5338077.cms (last visited Mar. 27, 2010); Broder,
supra note 140 (Poor and Emerging States).
177 Goswami, supra note 176.
178 Fiona Harvey, Rich Nations Step Up Pressure on Beifing, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/726ebIbc-e8e2-1 Ide-a756-
00144feab49a.html.
179 John Broder, et al., China and U.S. Hit Strident Impasse at Climate Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/
science/earth/15climate.html.
180 REUTERS, supra note 173. See also Ed Crooks, et al., Copenhagen talks enter
'new phase', FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.ft.com/
cmslsl01d459fc38-e97d-1 lde-be51-00l44feab49a.html.
181 REUTERS, Obama Notifies Congress of Asia-Pacific Trade Pact Intentions,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/
business/global/ 6trade.html.
182 Suzanne Goldenberg, Stephen Chu Pledges $350M Clean Tech Fund to
Sweeten Deal at Copenhagen, GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/14/copenhagen-steven-chu-
us.
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meant to illustrate the Obama Administration's commitment to
address climate change.
When the Conference recommenced, ministerial working
groups dedicated to addressing the most difficult diplomatic issues
- including financing and emissions caps - worked through the
night until 2am on Tuesday morning. 83
DAY 9: Tuesday, 15 December 2009
The ministerial working groups reconvened at 10 a.m. with
new vigor,184 but Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the UN,
downplayed their importance by conceding that a deal could be
struck without a firm commitment on long-term financing from
richer to poorer countries. He stated "[w]e can start next year
discussing this matter."185
Luminaries began trickling in to try to break the deadlock
as the intensity of the negotiations grew. Highlighting this
gearshift, Denmark's Prime Minister, Lars Lokke Rasmussen,
assumed the conference presidency from Connie Hedegaard,
Danish Minister for Climate and Energy, to oversee the final
stages.186 The idea to invite the heads of state was part of
Denmark's high-risk strategy, a gamble that diplomatic protocol
would somehow endure and that no supreme leader would want to
leave Copenhagen empty-handed.187 Fresh welcoming ceremonies
were held in the afternoon, attended by Ban Ki-Moon and new
arrivals including Britain's Gordon Brown and Prince Charles,'88
13 Crooks, supra note 180.
184
185 Fiona Harvey, Climate Deal in Balance Over Aid, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec.
15, 2009, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001030319/en/.
86 Broder, supra note 142.
87 Fiona Harvey et al., Procedural Disputes Block Climate Accord,
FINANCIALTIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3e382b9a-ea3f-
11 de-aeb6-00l44feab49a.html.
18 Prince Charles of the U.K. gave a somber address during the formal opening
of high-level talks, telling ministers that "our planet has reached a point of
crisis," leaving only seven years before "we lost the levers of control" on the
climate. Press Association, Prince Charles Copenhagen Speech: The Eyes of the
World are Upon You, THE GUARDIAN, Dec 15, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.
uk/environment/2009/dec/ 15/prince-charles-speech-copenhagen-climate (last
visited Mar. 23, 2010); see also John Vidal, Prince of Wales Warns Copenhagen
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Australia's Kevin Rudd, and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.189 Soon
thereafter, any scheduled activities gave way to ad hoc -
sometimes chaotic - meetings between chief executives. Imposing
120 heads of state on a process normally driven by career
diplomats commenced what was described as a "wild roller coaster
ride."' 90
Despite the fresh presence, the border adjustments
negotiations continued into the Tuesday afternoon docket. Drawing
a line in the sand, Australia, the U.S. and the EU firmly refused to
renounce tariffs as part of their climate control negotiating
strategies.191 However, one reporter indicated that the issue may
have turned a corner, as Australia, the U.S. and China agreed in
principle not to use climate objectives as a cloak for
protectionism.192 Yu Qingtai warned that his country would
"always oppose the actions by any countries to make use of
protection of the environment or climate as a pretext to conduct
trade protectionism,"' 93 and China and the U.S. remained at an
impasse over emissions caps and China's repeated refusal to
submit to international emissions monitoring.
Summit That Planet is in Crisis, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2010, available at
http://www. guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/15/copenhagen-redd-
deforestation.
189 President Obama spoke via telephone with leaders of some of the world's
most vulnerable countries including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of
Bangladesh and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. Hasina highlighted
how Bangladesh's people will be especially affected by global warming, while
Meles underscored the need for progress on the three pillars of emission cuts,
adaptation and financing to help the world's poorest countries. Darren
Sameulsohn et al., Nations Play Hardball as Hillary Clinton Heads to Climate
Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/
12/15/15greenwire-nations-play-hardball-as-hillary-clinton-heads-61556.html.
190 This term was used to describe the later diplomacy by Robert C. Orr, the UN
Assistant Secretary General for Policy and Planning. Andrew Revkin et al., U.N.
Climate Talks 'Take Note' of Accord Backed by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20climate.html.
191 Reuters, supra note 175.
192 id
193id
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DAY 10: Wednesday, 16 December 2009
Growing tensions outside the Conference boiled over, as
Danish police arrested hundreds of protesters and stopped
thousands more from storming the convention hall. 194Inside, the
proceedings remained bogged down in procedural and substantive
disputes. One meeting to discuss a draft text slated to begin at 1
p.m. "had yet to convene at 8:15 p.m."195 A group of developing
countries reopened a draft text on technology transfer, which
developed countries immediately rejected as unacceptable and
destructive international intellectual property rights.1 96Japan
attempted to break the deadlock by offering more financial
assistance to the developing world, raising its aid proposal from $9
billion to about $15 billion until 2012, contingent upon a broader
agreement.197
The Conference's first breakthrough came on the issue of
deforestation, as a proposed agreement would compensate
developing countries for preserving their forests.198 The agreement
would set up a CDM-like system whereby poorer countries could
collect foreign monies while richer nations use the program to
cancel out domestic emissions under cap and trade mechanisms.199
The U.S. pledged $1 billion to help poor countries preserve their
forests, while Australia, France, Japan, Norway and the UK
pledged an additional $2.5 billion if an overall climate change deal
could be reached.200
The notable happening of the day, however, was how the
media was increasingly used to bring pressure to bear across the
two camps. Grandstanding took precedence over actual negotiation
194 Jonathan Watts et al., Copenhagen Day of Mass Protest Passes Without
Major Incident, GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/dec/16/copenhagen-protest.
195 Harvey et. al., "Procedural Disputes," supra note 187.
196 Id
197 Id
198 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Climate Talks Near Deal to Save Forests, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/science/earth/ 16
forest.html.
1991d.
200 Harvey et. al., "Procedural Disputes," supra note 187.
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201
as the leaders arrived. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opened
the day by publishing an editorial stressing the importance of
international verification standards to the developed bloc. 202 In her
editorial she stated:
A successful agreement depends upon a number of
core elements, but two are shaping up to be essen-
tial: first, that all major economies set forth strong
national actions and resolve to implement them; and
second, that they agree to a system that enables full
transparency and creates confidence that national
actions are in fact being implemented.203
She added that "[t]ransparency, in particular, is what will ensure
that this agreement becomes operational, not just aspirational,"
noting a position shared by many members of the U.S. Senate. The
PPP theme reemerged in these comments, "[w]e all need to take
our share of responsibility, stand behind our commitments, and
mean what we say in order for an international agreement to be
credible." 204Reports also began surfacing in the Western media
blaming the developing countries, especially China, for raising the
interminable procedural objections that prevented the talks from
progressing.205 Though not conceding obstructionism, Jairam
Ramesh, India's environment minister, confirmed that China,
India, Brazil and South Africa were united and "coordinating our
positions almost on an hourly basis."206
Later in the day, these major emerging countries announced
their intention to collectively reduce carbon emissions by 2.1
gigatons by 2020 but, in a major show of force, insisted that they
do it voluntarily and without outside verification.207 This
201 Id.
202 Hillary Rodham Clinton, The U.S. is on Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/opinion/ 5iht-edclinton.html.
203 id
204
205 Harvey et. al., "Procedural Disputes," supra note 187.
206 Sameulsohn et. al., supra note 189.
207 id
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announcement was accompanied by demands. China and India, in
particular, repeated their GBDR-charged call that industrialized
countries increase their legally-binding reduction targets under the
terms of the Kyoto Protocol. 208 "Developing countries are taking
their actions, and we are calling for developed countries to take
their historical responsibilities squarely," said Xie Zhenhua, a
Chinese envoy, adding "[w]e demand developed countries cut
emissions seriously." 2 09 Premier Wen Jiabao, the highest Chinese
official to attend the Conference, arrived to take command of the
Chinese delegation that evening.210
Despite the day's progress, Andreas Carlgren, Sweden's
Environmental Minister and holder of the rotating European Union
presidency, admitted that the overall negotiations were proving
increasingly "frustrating." Minister Carlgren offered more EU
concessions conditional on the U.S. and China showing flexibility,
stating "[w]e're still expecting them both to raise their ambition
level for emissions reduction." 2 11Yvo de Boer gave a dour
metaphor to summarize the day's events, claiming that the
negotiating "cable car" had ground to a stop. 2 12 Former U.S. Vice
President Al Gore further lowered expectations, suggesting that a
binding agreement may not come before the July 2010 COP-16
meeting in Mexico City, rather than by the end of the week.213
208
209 Id.
210 Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN Office at Geneva, Wen Jiabao
Arrives in Copenhagen for the Leaders' Meeting of the Climate Change
Conference, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t646415.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2010).
211 Crooks, et al., Copenhagen Talks Enter 'New Phase,' FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec.
14, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d459fc38-e97d-1lde-be51-
001 44feab49a.htm 1.
212 Bryan Walsh, With One Day to Go, Climate Talks Remain Stalled, TIME,
Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/
0,28804,1929071 1929070 1948612,00.html.
213 Bill Blakemore, Copenhagen Climate Talks: Gore Takes Stage, ABC NEWS,
Dec. 16, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/gore-schwarzenegger-
copenhagen-%20climate-summit/story?id=9344940.
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DAY 11: Thursday, 17 December 2009
The Americans took command of the headlines early on
Thursday when Secretary Clinton announced support for a plan for
developed countries to provide poorer nations with $100 billion
per year by 2020 to fight climate change. 214 The plan calls for $30
billion a year in the short term, rising to $50 billion per year by
2015 and culminating for $100 billion a year by 2020. Secretary
Clinton said the money would be a mix of public and private funds
that, although not specified, would include "alternative sources of
finance."215 She also did not state what the American contribution
to the fund would be, but it is typical for the U.S. to contribute
20% in such international financing efforts. 216
That $100 billion offer came with two familiar strings,
however: first, that it would only be made available in the event of
a legally binding agreement and, second, that the resulting
agreement incorporates a commitment from China and other
developing nations about greater transparency and verification in
its emissions reporting.217 "If there is not even a commitment to
pursue transparency, that is a kind of deal breaker for us . . . it
would be hard to imagine that there could be the level of financial
commitment I have just announced in the absence of transparency
from the biggest emitter and soon-to-be and possibly already the
second-biggest economy," Clinton said.218
The American proposal inspired strong responses and
revitalized the negotiating process. Developing countries previous-
214 Suzanne Goldenberg, US Bids to Break Copenhagen Deadlock with Support
for $100bn Climate Fund, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.
uk/environment/2009/dec/ 17/us-copenhagen-100bn-climate-fund.
215 John Broder et al., Obama Has Goal to Wrest a Deal in Climate Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/science/earth/18
climate.html.
216 id
217 Id; see also Helene Cooper & John Broder, Obama Presses China for
Accountability on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.elsalvador.org/Embajadas/eeuu/Prensa2.nsf/
aac7d56ca8fd884b852563be00610639/f9dcb7c6e760389685257690004ea2b6?
OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
218 Fiona Harvey et al., Race Against the Clock for Climate Deal, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c852a4c4-ebOO-11de-a~el-
00144feab49a.html.
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ly opposed the $100 billion figure as too low, demanding 0.5
percent of rich countries' gross domestic product, amounting to
about $250 billion annually. 219 Though some developing countries
rejected the offer out of hand, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi - a key African voice - voiced satisfaction.220 China's He
Yafei also responded positively by indicating that his country
would consider voluntary "international exchanges" of information
221
on its climate programs.
Yvo de Boer celebrated the new tone of these announce-
ments by declaring "[t]he cable car is moving again." 222However,
despite being the most successful day of the conference so far,
Thursday ended on a sober note as the Chinese delegation
downplayed overall expectations. Chinese officials forecast the
most optimistic outcome of the Copenhagen Conference to be a
two-page agreement, lacking "immediate, operational" signifi-
cance. Such a brief document would surely contain few details and
postpone any meaningful progress for years.223
DAY 12: Friday, December 18, 2009
Air Force One touched down in Copenhagen on Friday
morning, introducing President Obama to the diplomatic equation.
Within hours he was in an ad hoc meeting with 17 other high-level
224
world leaders, a session which delayed the opening of the
219 Ed Crooks, Hopes for Climate Deal Face Setback, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec.
16, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5a4fd2d8-e9d6-Ilde-ae43-00144feab49a.
html; see also Henry Lutaaya, Developing Countries Set Tougher Targets,
Climate Change Media Partnership, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.climatemedia
partnership.org/reporting/stories/developing-countries-set-tougher-targets.
220 Juliet Eilperin & David A. Fahrenthold, At Copenhagen, Both Rich and
Developing Nations Offer Concessions, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/16/AR2009121
600701.html.
221 Broder et. al., supra note 215.
222 Copenhagen Climate Conference Moving Again: UN Official, XINHUA, Dec.
17,2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/17/content 12663621.htm.
223 Juliet Eilperin and Anthony Faiola, U.S. Pledges Billions, China Says
Climate Pact is Doubtful, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://
positivereform.com/5329/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
224 Cooper & Broder, supra note 217.
2010-2011]1 49
50 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
morning plenary session.225 According to the Western media, the
U.S. and EU delegations considered it a snub that Premier Wen did
not attend, sending He Yafei in his place instead.226 The Chinese
characterize the event as a miscommunication due to the ad hoc
nature of the meetings, claiming that Premier Wen was never
formally invited.227
While President Obama conducted these exclusive
negotiations, Premier Wen made unilateral pledges to the plenary,
conceding that China would report its emissions as part of an
international plan, but would not submit to external verification by
stating "[w]e will further enhance domestic surveillance and
monitoring methods, increase transparency and actively engage in
international dialogue and cooperation." 228 He stressed that China
is voluntarily reducing its emissions growth rate and has "not
attached any condition to the target or linked it to the target of any
other country. We are fully committed to meeting or even
exceeding the target." 229 Premier Wen also provided statistics to
support China's climate mitigation actions and apply pressure to
the developed countries. He asserted that there has been a 51%
growth in China's renewable-energy output between 2005-2008,
that China planted 20 million hectares of forests during the same
time period, and that developed countries had produced 80% of
emissions over the past 200 years.230
Shortly after noon, President Obama delivered a brief
address to the assembly of world leaders designed to influence the
final hours of negotiations.231 Eleven minutes long, it included
225 id.
226 Id.
227 Wen says he was never formally notified of the late-night Dec. 17 event and
sent Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to register a protest. Wen said no explanation
had been given about the lack of a formal invitation. China Alleges Diplomatic
Snub at Copenhagen Summit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hlFHlfl-4chOM4bTrl5oi
jjInyyPgD9EE7NUOO; see also Cooper & Broder, supra note 217 (noting Wen
speaking to Plenary Conference).
228 Cooper & Broder, supra note 217.
229 Id.
230 China's Thing About Numbers, supra note 139.
231 Cooper & Broder, supra note 217.
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pointed remarks about China's resistance to emissions monitoring
mechanisms, making it clear that U.S. participation was contingent
upon Chinese flexibility. 232"Without such accountability, any
agreement would be empty words on a page."233After the speech,
President Obama and Premier Wen met privately for 55 minutes.
The meeting broke up a little after 1:35 p.m., with a White House
official reporting only that the two "made progress." 234
After a tedious afternoon and with the prospects for an
agreement fading fast, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen invited
about 25 heads of state to a "Friends of the Chair" session for
private negotiations. 235 The breakthrough finally came later that
night. According to senior American officials, a dramatic moment
occurred in the middle of the night when President Obama and
Secretary Clinton burst into a clandestine meeting of the BASIC
leaders and inspired new talks.236 Sergio Serra, a senior Brazilian
negotiator, recalled the late meeting and President Obama's
entrance, but did not confirm that he was uninvited.237 Regardless
of theatrics, in a matter of hours President Obama would announce
that these five major nations - Brazil, China, India, South Africa
and the United States - forged a deal.
232 John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations' Climate Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/
earth/ 9climate.html.
233 Barack Obama, Obama in Copenhagen Speech: Full Text, HUFFINGTON
PosT, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/18/ obama-in-
copenhagen-speec n 396836.html.
234 Cooper & Broder, supra note 217.
235 The "Friends of the Chair" is a UN device where a small number of
negotiators meet separately from the main negotiations and try to overcome an
impasse on a specific issue. Participants are usually chosen by the main
negotiating body; however, in this case, many delegates in the COP plenary
were opposed to forming another negotiating track, and it is not quite clear how
much was known to other delegations and leaders about the final composition of
the group, its goals, and even whether or not it was indeed meeting. International
Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD], Summary of the Copenhagen
Climate Change Conference, 7-19 December 2009, (UK), Dec. 22, 2009,
http://www.iisd.ca/voll2/enb12459e.html.
236 Revkin, supra note 189.
237 Broder, supra note 232.
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DAY 13: Saturday, December 19, 2009
Though calling the three-page accord "an unprecedented
breakthrough," President Obama simultaneously acknowledged
that it fell well short of what was required to combat global
warming. Nonetheless, it was he that formally submitted it to the
COP.2 38 By early morning it seemed that the COP may not approve
the deal. Many countries were upset by the final stages of the
process, averring that they were locked out of the most vital
negotiations.239 By 9 a.m. four countries - Venezuela, Bolivia,
Cuba and Nicaragua - expressed their "implacable opposition,"
destroying any hope that the Accord could be formally adopted as
a UN decision.240 Sudanese diplomat Lumumba Stanislaus Di-
Aping, voice of the G77, articulated the most animated denun-
ciation of the Accord, declaring it "the worst development in
climate change negotiations in history."24 1 "Only after several
more hours of back-room wrangling did a restarted plenary, with a
new chair, get the Accord adopted after a fashion." 242
In the end, the UN conference settled upon a much weaker
"decision to note" the Accord, leaving countries free to abide by it,
but requiring a consensus at a future general meeting to implement
it into the foundation of a new treaty. Thus, the bottom line at
Copenhagen was not good: the world emerged without a
framework to address climate change post-2012.
DAY 14+: THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
The nationalistic and factional blame exchanges that
defined the negotiations boiled over into all-out recriminations at
its close. It is clear that several Western governments were
238 Broder, supra note 232.
239 Revkin, supra note 189.
240 Harvey, supra note 140.
241 Such rhetoric proved abrasive. "I call on my brother from Sudan to rethink
his conclusions and get hold of his emotions," admonished Dessima Williams of
Grenada, representative of the Alliance of Small Island States, as she accepted a
deal that fell far short of the islanders' hopes. Broder, supra note 233; China's
Thing About Numbers, supra note 139.
242 China's Thing About Numbers, supra note 139.
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frustrated by positions advocated by Beijing,243 and angered by
244Premier Wen's alleged snub of President Obama. One of the
most pointed criticisms came from British Energy and Climate
Change Secretary Ed Miliband, who stated that China tried to
"hijack" the Conference and displayed "a farcical picture to the
public." 24 5 The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded quickly,
characterizing the remarks as being made by "an individual British
politician" and containing "obvious political attempts" to escape
obligations and foment discord among developing countries.246
The state-run Xinhua news agency lamented that "after the
conference ended, China has taken the brunt of the blame," 247 and
moved to highlight positive Chinese contributions:
China, at the conference, also made some con-
cessions to show its sincerity and the spirit of
243 "China reject[ed] the target of 80 percent emission reductions by 2050 for
developed countries which some European governments believed had already
been agreed upon." Geoff Dyer, China Hails Deal Despite Being Cast Villain,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c42ead8c-ee54-
I Ide-944c-00144feab49a.html.
244 "Twice during the day, Mr. Wen sent an underling to represent him at the
meetings with Mr. Obama. To make things worse, each time it was a lower-level
official [Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei and Special Representative on Climate
Change Yu Qingtai] . . . The White House made a point of noting the snub in a
statement to reporters. Mr. Obama, for his part, said to his staff: "I don't want to
mess around with this anymore. I want to talk to Wen," according to an aide.
Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/
earth/20accord.html.
245 Ed Miliband, China Tried to Hijack Copenhagen Climate Deal, GUARDIAN,
Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/ dec/20/ed-
miliband-china-copenhagen-summit.
246 Embassy of the PRC in the USA, China Refutes British Qfficial's "Hiack"
Attack Over Copenhagen Talks, XINHUA, Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/t647253.htm; Embassy of the PRC in the USA,China Says
Rich Countries Responsible for Slow Copenhagen Talks Progress, Embassy,
XINHUA, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ t645668.htm. ("If the talks have
encountered some difficulties and made slow progress, the main reason is that
the developed countries have moved backward on the key issues of funding and
technology," said Jiang).
247 Lu Xuede, Obstruction of Developed Nations, XINHUA, Jan. 11, 2010,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-01 /11 /content 9297092.htm.
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cooperation. For example, China backed off and
conceded the target of limiting global warming to a
maximum 2 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial
times be written into the Copenhagen Accord.
Moreover, China has not only helped developing
countries gain as much fund as possible from
developed countries to fight climate change, but
provided aid within its capacity to developing
-248
countries.
Xinhua editorials also expressed Chinese disappointment at the
U.S., saying "[lt]he world has high hopes that the U.S. can take the
lead in coping with the global warming challenge. But Obama
failed to offer new U.S. commitments for deeper emission cuts that
some see as crucial," 249 and developed nations in general:
Compared with China's pragmatic and problem-
solving approach, developed countries were impos-
ing unreasonable and unilateral demands on devel-
oping countries. For example, in the conference's
run-up to the Copenhagen Accord, developed
countries still were not authorizing the Bali Action
Plan and its proposed international supervision on
less-compliant emissions reduction plans by less-
developed countries.250
The Chinese media is also keen to highlight the first major exercise
of China's new diplomatic authority:
248 Yu Zhixiao, China plays key role in ensuring success of Copenhagen climate
talks, XINHUA, Dec. 25, 2009, http://lr.china-embassy.org/eng/majorevents/
t648 141.htm; China Stands as Constructive Player in Copenhagen, supra note
134.
249 Fu Jing & Li Jing, Wen Meets Obama on Day of Whirlwind Diplomacy,
XINHUA, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/19/
content 9202260.htm.
250 Xuede, supra note 246.
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China's confidence was highlighted in its adherence
to its substantial principles on climate change. First,
China stuck to the dual-track mechanism of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Kyoto Protocol on the principle of "common but
differentiated responsibilities." Second, China
turned down some developed countries' demands to
link China's voluntary mitigation actions with
developed countries' compulsory emissions reduc-
tion targets. Premier Wen said the Chinese commit-
ments are "nonnegotiable and unconditional."
Third, China refused to set a fixed year for peak
emissions, as it would more or less hinder the devel-
opment of developing countries, which are still
faced with the priority tasks of economic devel-
opment and poverty reduction. China believed it
was unhelpful to prescribe such a year, as different
countries had different characteristics and were at
different development stages, and developing
countries may face more uncertainties in their future
development.25'
Others take a more "balanced" view, such as Swedish Environment
Minister Andreas Carlgren, who blames the U.S. and China
equally for the failure to make more progress. 252 Likewise, the
noted American commentator Friedman mocked positions of the
superpowers:
The Chinese have basically said "We promise not to
go over the speed limit, but we want no police, no
courts, no stoplights, no real transparency on their
carbon emissions... [a]nd President Obama is
251 Yu Zhixiao, China Plays Key Role Making Copenhagen Talks Successful,
XINHUA, Dec. 25, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/25/
content 12704224.htm.
252 Yu Zhixiao, Unreasonable to Rebuke China Over Climate Talks, XINHUA,
Dec. 24, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/24/content
12698130.htm.
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saying, "If you think I can get that through the U.S.
Congress - that China promises to be good on
carbon - well, I've got a bridge in Brooklyn I'd like
to sell you." 253
Indeed, the U.S. and China are likely to be blamed, and are perhaps
deserving of the blame, because they are the largest contributors to
global warming, hold the strongest bargaining positions and any
ultimate agreement will need their blessing. After all, their
compromises were crucial to the existence of the Copenhagen
Accord.
V. THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD
The Copenhagen Accord did not meet even the modest
expectations that the Conference leaders had set. First, it notably
failed to meet the goal of creating an international treaty. Second,
it failed to result in any binding emissions caps or an international
benchmark. Third, it failed to promise an international treaty, as
language calling for a binding accord "as soon as possible," and no
later than November, 2010, was dropped at the behest of China,
India and Saudi Arabia.254
However, the text is not empty. Significant compromises
were made on the "three pillars:" emissions cuts, financing and
verification, discussed herein. Notably missing is any significant
progress on technology transfer, but the adoption of a new
deforestation program is a pleasant surprise.
A. Emissions Cuts
The Accord honored an objective agreed upon by most of
the delegations to cap the rise in global temperatures at 20 C, the
253 Daniel Carty, Friedman: Copenhagen a U.S.-China Power Struggle, CBS
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5994673-
503543.html.
254 XINHUA, New Climate Draft Drops Treaty Deadline, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 19,
2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/19/content 9201708.htm;
Broder, supra note 232; China's Thing About Numbers, supra note 139.
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maximum level the IPCC predicts could avert the worst effects of
global warming:255
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention
to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,
we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the
increase in global temperature should be below 2
degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the
context of sustainable development, enhance our
long-term cooperative action to combat climate
change.256
To achieve the 20 C goal, scientists predict that the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere should not exceed 450 parts per
million.257 The International Energy Agency (lEA) calculates that
if the US were to increase its cut to 18%, the EU to 27%, and
China to 47%, then 450ppm would be achievable, but predicts that
it will require an expenditure of $10.5 trillion in low-carbon
technologies between 2010 and 2030.258
255 International Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report,
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm.
256 The Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 at 1., available at
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced-search/items/3594.php?re
c-j&priref=600005666&data=&title=&author=&keywords=&symbol=&meetin
g=%22Conference+of+the+Parties+%28COP%29%2C+Fifteenth+session%2C+
7-18+December+2009%2C+Copenhagen%2C+Denmark%22&mo from=&year
from=&mo to=&year to=&1ast days=&anf=0&sorted date sort&dirc=DESC
&seite 1#beg (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
257 The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at P. 12 (leaving open the
possibility of attaining the long term goal of a temperature rise of 1.5 degrees
Celsius); See also John Vidal, Vulnerable Nations at Copenhagen Summit Reject
2C Target, GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/dec/10/copenhagen-climate-change (noting the that many
countries pushed for a lower target, such as 350 ppm, that would limit global
warming to no more than 1.50C); Ed Crooks & Fiona Harvey, 'Big Prize'
Appears Out of Reach, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/168b0dfe-ea70- 11de-a9f5-00144feab49a.html.
258 Crooks and Harvey, supra note 257.
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How achieving this goal will be implemented is unclear, as
the Copenhagen Accord does not mandate any binding emissions
cuts. This is a significant retreat from the Kyoto Protocol. Rather,
each developed nation is invited to commit to cuts and list them in
an appendix, laying out only what each country's voluntary
intentions are:
Annex I Parties commit to implement individually
or jointly the quantified economy-wide emissions
targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given
in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat
by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF
document.259
President Obama stressed their non-binding effect on the United
States during his final address:
It will not be legally binding ... With respect to the
emissions targets that are going to be set, we know
that they will not be by themselves sufficient to get
to where we need to get by 2050. So that's why I
say that this is going to be a first step . . . From the
perspective of the United States, I've set forth goals
that are reflected in legislation that came out of the
House that are being discussed on a bipartisan basis
in the Senate. And although we will not be legally
bound by anything that took place here today, we
will I think have reaffirmed our commitment to
meet those targets.260
Developing nations like China and India are once again not
required to take on binding targets to cut their emissions, but they
are encouraged to take on "nationally appropriate mitigation
259 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at T 4.
260 Barack Obama, Text: Obama's Remarks on the Climate Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/
19climate.text.html.
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actions," or NAMAs.261 These NAMAs would set out "measur-
able, reportable and verifiable" actions that the countries would
take to curb the growth of their emissions in future.262 The Accord
reads:
Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties
will be subject to their domestic measurement,
reporting and verification the result of which will be
reported through their national communications
263
every two years.
These actions include investing in energy efficiency and renewable
sources of energy. Both China and India formalized their pledges
on Tuesday, March 9, 2010.264 Although their promises are not as
concrete as the West would like they are nonetheless significant,
marking the first time that developing countries have accepted
their growing responsibility and voluntarily offered mitigation
targets. Thus, reading between the lines of the Accord, the PPP is
given formal credence in the post-Kyoto era.265
B. Financial Assistance
The most vulnerable developing countries came to
Copenhagen seeking financing from developed countries in order
to help them cut emissions and adapt to the effects of climate
change. They found a friend in China. While He Yafei pledged that
his country did not expect money from the U.S. or other "rich
countries,"266 he insisted that "financial resources for the efforts of
261 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at T 4.
262 Id
263 Id
264 John M. Broder, China and India to Join Copenhagen Climate Change
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/
science/earth/lOclimate.html.
265 India set a domestic emissions intensity reduction target of 20 to 25 percent
by 2020 compared with 2005 levels, excluding its agricultural sector. Id.
266 China Stands as Constructive Player in Copenhagen, XINHUA, Dec. 26,
2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/26/content_12706368.htm;
Crooks, supra note 219.
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developing countries [are] a legal obligation." 267 Yu Qingtai cited
the original 1992 UNFCCC as precedent saying "the developed
countries committed themselves to cover the full incremental costs
of developing countries actions to adapt or mitigate against climate
change." 268China's advocacy for financing revalidates its diplo-
matic alliances among the world's poorest nations, particularly in
Africa, to whom financing is the highest priority. Their enthusiasm
was matched by stiff and realistic resistance on behalf of the
developed countries, suffering a collective economic malaise and
wallowing in oppressive domestic debts. Yet pleasant surprises
emerged, such as when one developing country - Brazil - vowed
to contribute to financing to help poorer countries deal with
climate change, becoming the first developing country to do so. 269
Indeed, financing is the only legal obligation any parties
accept under the Accord. Thus, the longest and most detailed
provision of the Accord regards it. A goal of mobilizing $10 billion
a year in public and private financing to help poor countries cope
with climate change over the next three years, with a long-term
goal of $100 billion annually by 2020 is codified therein:270
8. Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and
adequate funding as well as improved access shall be
provided to developing countries, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable
and support enhanced action on mitigation . . .. The
collective commitment by developed countries is to
provide new and additional resources . . . approach-
ing USD 30 billion for the period 2010. 2012 with
balanced allocation between adaptation and mitiga-
tion. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for
267 Crooks, supra note 219.
268 Andrew C. Revkin, China Presses Case for Climate Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2009, http: /dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/china-presses-case-for-
climate-aid/.
269 CLIMATICO, Copenhagen De-briefing: An Analysis of COP15 for Long-Term
Cooperation, Jan. 2010, http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/
2010/01 /post-copl5-report52.pdf at 11.
270 The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at T 8 (emphasis added).
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the most vulnerable developing countries, such as
the least developed countries, small island develop-
ing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful
mitigation actions and transparency on implementa-
tion, developed countries commit to a goal of
mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by
2020 to address the needs of developing countries.
This funding will come from a wide variety of
sources, public and private, bilateral and multi-
lateral, including alternative sources of finance...
A new, multilateral governance structure is envisioned to disburse
the funds, a significant portion of which will flow through the new
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.271 Furthermore, a "high-level
panel" is to be established to study the contribution of the potential
sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, to
meeting this goal.272
C. Verification and Compliance
Bifuracted responsibilities on Annex I and non-Annex I
parties were present at the creation, enshrined in the UNFCCC. For
example, while UNFCCC Article 12 requires both Annex I and
non-Annex I parties to submit national communications of GHG
inventories, 273 the frequency and detail of the submissions required
of the two camps is very different.274 Furthermore, the Convention
does not contain a compliance mechanism. It does provide for the
development of a "Multilateral Consultative Process" to address
271 Id. Mexico and Norway put forth a proposal to establish a new Copenhagen
Green Climate Fund that would finance mitigation and adaptation actions of the
developing countries. The Green Fund would receive financial resources
through two tracks - one that would have a determined amount of emission
allowances for countries for auctioning, and one track that would utilize public
resource contributions from developed countries according to their amount of
emissions, GDP, and population.
272 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at T 9.
273 UNFCCC, supra note 28, art. 12.
274 Id. (For example, the inventories of non-Annex I parties need not be reported
separately, but as part of their national communications).
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issues regarding implementation of commitments,2 7 5 but none has
yet been established under its auspices.276 The Kyoto Protocol and
Marrakesh Accords, by contrast, established a Compliance Com-
mittee. Composed of both a Facilitative Branch and an Enforce-
ment Branch, it may impose strict consequences if an Annex I
* 277party breaches its emission targets or reporting requirements.
Kyoto expanded the inventory reporting requirements for Annex I
parties to enable compliance determinations 278and such compliance
is precondition for participating in emissions trading and the other
flexible mechanisms.279
The Copenhagen Accord represents a step backwards. The
verification requirements are on par with previous agreements and
Annex I Parties commit that their emissions reductions will be
measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing
guidelines to ensure that such accounting is "rigorous, robust and
transparent." 280 However, there are no compliance mechanisms,
enforcement mechanisms, or penalties.
In accordance with UNFCCC and Kyoto precedent, the
developing countries again refused to accept international verifi-
cation of their mitigation actions. Yet, in order for a final agree-
ment to be achieved, China agreed to increase the transparency of
and voluntary submit records of its mitigation actions.2 8 1
Specifically, China and other Non-Annex I Parties agreed to
implement mitigation actions subject to "domestic measurement,
reporting and verification the result of which will be reported
275 UNFCCC, supra note 28, art. 13.
276 UNFCCC Glossary of Climate Change and Forestry, Ad Hoc Group on
Article 13 or AGl3, http://unfcccbali.org/unfccc/component/option,com
glossary/Itemid,99/func,view/catid,3 1/term,Ad+Hoc+Group+on+Article+13,+or
+AG13/; see also http://unfccc.int/cop3/resource/ag13.htm.
277 Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the
Conference of the Parties at 68, UN DOC FCCC/CP/2001/13.Add.3 (Jan. 21,
2001).
278 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, art. 8.
279id
280 The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at T 4.
281 China Stands as Constructive Player in Copenhagen, XINIHUA, Dec. 26,
2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/26/content 12706368.htm.
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through their national communications every two years."282 They
were careful to assert, however, that any such communications
include "provisions for international consultations and analysis
under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national
sovereignty is respected." 283 For all of its drawbacks, this approach
has the advantage of giving greater latitude to national govern-
ments, thereby creating less domestic resentment.
However, it carries the disadvantage of international
suspicion and distrust.284Indeed, China demands autonomy and
respect, the U.S. seeks reassurance. These concerns may not be as
incompatible as they seem, especially in light of the final
comments made by President Obama:
The problem actually is not going to be verification
in the sense that this international consultation and
analysis mechanism will actually tell us a lot of
what we need to know. And the truth is that we can
actually monitor a lot of what takes place through
satellite imagery and so forth. So I think we're
going to have a pretty good sense of what countries
are doing.285
President Obama's speech indicated that the U.S. intends to
practice non-intrusive monitoring of China's GHG emissions.
Instead of trying to place "boots on the ground," the international
community can employ alternative means such as satellite imag-
ing, weather observatories, and aeronautical and marine tests to
gauge compliance from the outside. China is on notice that such
efforts will be made.
282 The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at 5.
283 id
284 Id. (It is also worth noting that NAMAs relying upon international financing
are subject to stricter scrutiny: namely, international measurement, reporting and
verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the
Parties).
285 Barack Obama, Text: Obama's Remarks on the Climate Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/
19climate.text.html.
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D. Technology Transfer
Notably missing from the Copenhagen Accord is any
significant progress on the issue of technology transfer: the
distribution of intellectual property from companies in rich
286
countries.26 Legally speaking, Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC
affirmed by Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol committed developed
countries to taking "all practicable steps to promote facilitate and
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to,
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other
Parties."287 Yet, recalcitrance is high in additional to ideological
and practical difficulties, and entrenched patent laws protect
private property.288
On May 19, 2009 the UNFCCC released a draft negotiating
text including various "measures to address intellectual property
rights" by attacking patent laws.289 One controversial option
provided:
Specific measures {shall / should} be established to
remove barriers to development and transfer of
technologies from developed to developing Parties
arising from intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection, including: (a) Compulsory licensing for
specific patented technologies; (b) Pooling and
286 The only mention of technology transfer in the Accord is a single sentence.
See The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256, at 11.
287 United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC),
1992, art. 4.5, available at http://unfccc.int/essential background/convention/
background/items/2853.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2010); Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997,
2303 U.N.T.S. 162, art. 10.
288 Cyrus Frelinghuysen, Countdown to Copenhagen: The Debate Over Tech-
nology Transfers and the Protection ofIntellectual Property, GLOBAL CLIMATE
L. BLOG, July 13, 2009, http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/ 2009/07/articles/
intellectual-property/countdown-to-copenhagen-the-debate-over-technology-
transfers-and-the-protection-of-intellectual-property/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
289 Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, Sixth Session, FCCC/A WGLCA/2009/8: Negotiating Text, May 19,
2009, at pp. 46-53, ! 180-197, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/
eng/08.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
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sharing publicly funded technologies and making
the technologies available in the public domain at
an affordable price; (c) Taking into account the
example set by decisions in other relevant inter-
national forums relating to IPRs, such as the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public
Health.290
Another controversial proposal that "LDCs [least developed
countries] be exempted from patent protection of climate-related
technologies for adaptation and mitigation, as required for
capacity-building and development needs." 291
In response, the U.S. House of Representatives preempt-
ively passed legislation opposing any global climate change treaty
that weakens IP rights.292 They declared that:
With respect to the [UNFCCC], the President, the
Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative
of the United States to the United Nations should
prevent any weakening of, and ensure robust
compliance with and enforcement of, existing
international legal requirements as of the date of the
enactment of this Act for the protection of
intellectual property rights related to energy or
environmental technology, including wind, solar,
biomass, geothermal, hydro, landfill gas, natural
gas, marine, trash combustion, fuel cell, hydrogen,
micro turbine, nuclear, clean coal, electric battery,
alternative fuel, alternative refueling infrastructure,
290 Negotiating Text, supra note 289, Option 2, pg. 48, 188.
291 Negotiating Text, supra note 289, Option 3, pg. 49, 189.
292 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, H.R.
2410, 111th Cong. H. Amend. 187 (A007), (sponsored by Rep. Rick Larsen,
[WA-2], June 10, 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?dlll:HRO2410:(dt@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Apr. 10, 2010)
(Section 1120A is entitled "Statement of Policy Regarding Climate Change").
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advanced vehicle, electric grid, or energy-
efficiency-related technologies.293
The prospects thus looked bleak before Copenhagen. During the
negotiations the U.S. committed to provide $85 million toward a
new five-year, $350 million effort to deploy clean energy
technologies in developing countries.294 Yet, the only reference to
technology transfer codified in the Accord reads:
In order to enhance action on development and
transfer of technology we decide to establish a
Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology
development and transfer in support of action on
adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a
country-driven approach and be based on national
-295
circumstances and priorities.
This "Technology Mechanism" is undefined; its structure, scope
and governance must therefore be decided later. Fortunately recent
negotiations have taken a more constructive turn, with developing
countries talking more of technology collaboration and cooperation
than transfer per se, as many energy companies now manufacture
their products in the developing world, notably China.296Others
predict that any official action is better suited to a series of bilateral
or multilateral agreements outside the UNFCCC, given the
293 id.
294 Suzanne Goldenberg, Stephen Chu Pledges $350M Clean Tech Fund to
Sweeten Deal at Copenhagen, GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/ 14/copenhagen-steven-chu-
us; Darren Samuelsohn et al., Copenhagen Talks Enter Final Phase, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/14/14climate
wire-copenhagen-talks-enter-fmal-phase-43362.html (noting Australia and Italy
as the other countries contributing funds).
295 The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256 at 11.
296 This reflects the reality of low-carbon technology deployment: companies
such as General Electric, Siemens and Vestas have moved to manufacture wind
turbines in the developing world, especially China. China is now one of the
world's biggest makers of wind turbines and the biggest exporter of solar panels.
Frelinghuysen, supra note 288.
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complexity of reaching a single arrangement for a range of
29technologies and contexts.29 Analysts assert that these
developments make official calls for a global tech transfer
agreement appear bygone.298
E. Deforestation
Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea originated a plan to
reduce deforestation in developing countries at COP-I1 in
Montreal, Canada.299 This led to the adoption of the Reducing
Emissions for Deforestation in Developing Countries (REDD+)
mechanism at Bali. 300 Discussions to flesh out the REDD+
progressed considerably in the negotiations leading up to
Copenhagen. 301 Although no final REDD+ agreement emerged
from Copenhagen, mentioned is made of it in the Accord thus
elevating it into official international climate law. The Accord
provides that:
We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission
from deforestation and forest degradation and the
need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas
emission by forests and agree on the need to
provide positive incentives to such actions through
the immediate establishment of a mechanism
297 CLIMATICO, Copenhagen De-briefing: An Analysis of COP15 for Long-Term
Cooperation at 24, Jan. 2010, http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/01 /post-cop I 5-report52.pdf.
298 Frelinghuysen, supra note 288.
299 UNFCCC, Fact Sheet: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in
Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, June 2009, http://
unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact sheet reducingemissi
ons from deforestation.pdf.
300 "The original Bali agreement simply called for reducing emissions from
deforestation (RED) and then progressed to include land degradation (REDD)."
CLIMATICO, supra note 297 at 12.
301 Discussion is built upon the preliminary work of the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Ad-hoc Working Group
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).
CLIMATICO, supra note 297.
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including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of
financial resources from developed countries. 302
The Copenhagen Green Climate Fund is intended to mobilize the
promised $30 billion funding from developed countries on REDD+
among mitigation related activities such as adaptation, technology,
and capacity-building for the years 2010 through 2012.303 As
discussed, several developing nations promised fast track financing
of $3.5 billon. The implementation stage (2013-2020) is expected
to cost between $20 billion and $30 billion. 304
VI. THE FUTURE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: A REBALANCING OF NORMS AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR DIPLOMATIC REALIGNMENT
The 192 delegations returned home with the task of ful-
filling their commitments, disparate as they may be. The Copen-
hagen Accord will be meaningless if the Parties, especially the
U.S. and China, fail to implement it as domestic policy. The
Chinese recognized well in advance that any Accord would depend
on Sino-American diplomacy, stating "[w]hether the Copenhagen
Conference succeeds will be decided by the positions of China and
the United States."305The renewed engagement and compromises
by the U.S. and China to the UNFCCC procedure over the past two
years and at Copenhagen are worth celebrating.
President Obama's domestic and international credibility
are on the line, as he has pledged to secure firm commitments on
GHG emissions and billions of dollars in long-term financing for
developing nations. Acquiring these from the U.S. Congress was
never going to be easy, especially considering the U.S.'s economic
recession and long-standing debt crisis. This unlikelihood is
aggravated by events such as President Obama committing a large
302 The Copenhagen Accord, supra note 256 at 6.
30 Id. at 8, 10.
304 CLIMATICO, supra note 297 at 15.
305 Tang Yonglin, Zhongmei Yu Re Xin Yi Lun Quan Qiu Qi Hou Tan Pan
[China and US Preheating New Round Global Climate Negotiations], SOUTH
CHINA MORNING PosT, June 3, 2009, http://www.infzm.com/ content/29460.
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portion of his political capital toward controversial domestic initia-
tives such as health care reform, a concerted attack on climate
science credibility following the publication of leaked communica-
tions between several overzealous climatologists, 306 and significant
Democratic losses in the November 2010 Congressional elections.
President Obama does not need the bill to be a leader at future
negotiations, but failure would undermine U.S. credibility to make
any significant commitments.
Premier Wen also returned to China with his Party's and
nation's credibility on the line before the international community.
Premier Wen committed China to achieving or exceeding the
emission reduction targets it has set for itself, pledging the 119
present heads of state that "[w]e will honor our word with real
action..."307 Domestically, Premier Wen and President Hu are
under intense pressure to make China greener due to the unyielding
nature of their political system. Unlike the bifurcated political
party system in the U.S. that inspires always ideological and
sometimes hypocritical wrangling, China's one political party has
no domestic opposition to blame. The Chinese Communist Party
must continually justify its ongoing relevance. Indeed, China is
306 The unauthorized release of hundreds of e-mails from a major climate
research center in England led to revelations about a handful of errors in an
IPCC report. Opponents of climate change, who call the episode "climategate,"
are using the episode in an attempt to undermine the UN Process. No scientific
body is under more hostile scrutiny than the IPCC, and "[t]he battle is
asymmetric, in the sense that scientists feel compelled to support their findings
with careful observation and replicable analysis, while their critics are free to
make sweeping statements condemning their work as fraudulent." Nonetheless,
climatologists have responded by pledging to make their work more transparent.
John M. Broder, Scientists Taking Steps to Defend Work on Climate, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/science/earth/
03climate.html.
307 Speaking at an informal high-level meeting, hosted by Danish Prime Minister
Lars Lokke Rasmussen, on the last day of the conference, Wen elaborated
China's achievements in developing clean energy and cutting greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Stressing that this is a voluntary move taken by China, Wen
said: "We have not attached any condition to the target, nor have we linked it to
the target of any other country." Li Xing, et al., China Committed to Emission
Cut: Wen, XINHUA (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.china daily.com.cn/china/2009-
12/19/content 9201775.htm.
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seeing the rapid growth of environmental activism. 308 There are
now more than 2,500 environmental NGOs in China, and the
Government estimates that 3.76 million citizens participated in
over 74,000 environmentally-related protests. 30 9 China's leadership
should expect to be taken to task internationally as well. China
portrays itself as a universally cooperative partner who represents
of the most vulnerable people of the world and,310 indeed, the
world will be watching.
Thus, the Copenhagen Accord may have changed the
polarity of the negotiating process. As one analyst keenly stated
before the Conference, "[j]ustice demands that old assumptions of
the North-South divide be revisited....,,311 Nations came in allied
between the developed-developing and rich-poor divide institution-
alized at Kyoto, but may realign or at least overlap around a new
* * * 312*
axis: overall emissions. International environmental law
contains provisions for legitimizing this occurrence. Whereas
CBDR almost exclusively dominated the post-Kyoto climate
change order and was used to absolve China of any legal
responsibilities in light of its local context, both the U.S. and China
are guilty under the PPP formulation which focuses upon current
emissions instead of historical responsibility. By sharing moral
responsibility for a solution with the developing world, the PPP is
between the lines of the Accord. Some balance now exists between
the two principles, albeit at the cost of many crucial Kyoto
provisions. The international community may emphasize the PPP
to extract greater commitments from the world's major GHG
emitters at later stages. "Indeed, the north-south divide is no longer
able to capture 'the complicated nature of the international political
308 Jahiel, supra note 100; Sitaraman, supra note 100; Cody, supra note 100.
309 Jahiel, supra note 100; Sitaraman, supra note 100; Cody, supra note 100.
310 Xu Suxia, Zhongguo Fou Ren Yu Mei Si Gao Qihou Xieyi, You Guanping
Lun Yu Shi Shi Bu Fu [China Denies That it Reached a Climate Treaty with the
U.S. in Secret], JIAXING, Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.cnjxol.com/cjpd/content/
2009-12/21 /content 1241036.htm.
311 Tan Kai Liang, supra note 135 at 55.
312 Andrew Light, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, also
notes this. See Geoff Dyer, China Hails Deal Despite Being Cast Villain,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c42ead8c-ee54-
11 de-944c-00 144feab49a.html.
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system' and is an 'overly simplistic binary classification of the
world'.... , CBDR should accommodate change and, "the focus
of attention [must be shifted] to issues ... and the problems of the
disadvantaged peoples of the developing world[j," 3 14 i.e., those
from arid areas and small island nations having the most to lose
from climate change.
If pursued this would force the U.S. and China into the
same corner, encouraging them to be partners instead of anta-
gonists. A healthy dialog between the two nations would eliminate
the unnecessary posturing and theatrics at formal conferences,
which should be more about signing and celebrating than posturing
and dramatics. Ongoing commentary about environmental issues
(which tangentially include so many other issues of common
concern), may yield many positive effects. Both Governments,
through a long and slow process, will gain a better sense of the
other. China welcomes this advantage:
[B]oth sides should carry out cooperation on the
climatic change issue because not only is it
advantageous that international society deal with
climatic change together, but moreover promoting
the development of the Sino-U.S. relationship has
important meaning.
Both sides recognize the need for cooperation. The world would
benefit by transforming these factions into a partnership. The U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue began this process. The
313 Nina E. Bafundo, Comment, Compliance with the Ozone Treaty: Weak States
and the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 21 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv., 461, 466, 495 (2006), quoted in Tan Kai Liang, supra note 136 at 56.
314 M Sornarajah, Power and Justice in International Law, 1 SING. J. INT'L
&COMP. L. 28, 33 (1997), quoted in Tan Kai Liang, supra note 135 at 56.
315 Cao Xin, Qi Hou Tan Pan: Zhongmei de Li Chang yu Cha Yi [Climate
Negotiations: China and U.S.'s Standpoint and Differences], SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.infzm.com/content/ 37696 (author's
own translation).
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second round was held in Beijing in May 2010.316 Though the
focus of the second round was once again upon economic and
financial issues, 317 the two sides "reiterate[d] to continue to
actively implement the China-US Memorandum of Understanding
on Strengthening Climate Change, Energy and Environment
Cooperation and the 10-Year Cooperation Framework of Energy
and Environment." 318 The nations also signed memoranda
promising to pursue cooperative partnerships on energy, nuclear
safety and green development. 319 Joint ventures on the develop-
ment of new clean energy technologies may be the linchpin of
progress. Indeed, U.S. Secretary for Commerce, Gary Locke,
predicted at the U.S.-China Business Council Annual Forecast
Conference that "clean energy and energy efficiency technologies
can be one of the most beneficial areas of cooperation in the
history of U.S.-China relations." 320 Such cooperation can provide a
new and feasible means to remove the thorny obstacle of
technology transfer which is defeating progress on many
multilateral environmental initiatives. Thus, the SED instru-
mentality may play a constructive (if not decisive) role in the
future. Through it, the U.S. and China may reach bilateral solutions
to a global crisis.
VII. CONCLUSION
In many aspects the Copenhagen Accord represents a
significant regression from the Kyoto Protocol. While it does
register some breakthroughs - such as setting a maximum global
316 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury Press Room, TG-722 Second Meeting
of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialog, 27 May 2010, available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg722.htm.
317id
318 Embassy of the PRC in the United Kingdom, "Draft Written Briefing on the
Second Round of China-US SEI)," 26 May 2010, available at http://www.
chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t704318.htm.
319id
320 Press Release, Gary Locke, U.S. Commerce Dept., "Remarks at U.S.-China
Business Council Annual Forecast Conference," 28 Jan. 2010, http://www.
commerce.gov/news/secretary-speeches/2010/01/28/remarks-us-china-business-
council-annual-forecast-conference.
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temperature increase, a system for monitoring and reporting
progress toward national pollution reduction goals (without
international surveillance), and for hundreds of billions of dollars
to flow from wealthy, developed nations to the developing world -
it is disappointing in many regards.
Most notably, the Accord sets neither binding obligations
for emissions reductions nor a timetable for concluding a binding
international treaty, leaving the implementation of its provisions
uncertain. It is likely to undergo many years of negotiations and
transformations before it emerges in any internationally
enforceable form. The next annual U.N. conference is slated for
November 2010 in Mexico City, but several influential leaders
have already downplayed expectations and aim to the next blip on
the comfortably indefinite horizon, South Africa 2011.321 Whether
there or thereafter, at some stage a document with specific
numbers and legal obligations will again become necessary.
The chaotic nature of the conference did not help to focus
the delegations, yet may produce a positive result. Whereas the
post-Kyoto era was the pinnacle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities, the "Polluter Pays" Principle may gain more
traction following Copenhagen. Nations that arrived divided
between developed and developing, rich and poor, left frustrated
by the relatively inflexible attitudes of the United States and China.
They may now cross-sides to realign and attack the world's two
largest overall GHG emitters. This would push the U.S. and China
into the same diplomatic corner, giving them two options. Ideally,
this would encourage them to be political allies instead of
antagonists, finding bilateral solutions instead of each blaming the
other and obstructing the broader negotiations. On the other hand,
if China and the U.S. steel their positions, the two sides risk
321 "The European Union's climate commissioner, Connie Hedegaard of
Denmark, said Tuesday that nations should now aim to reach an agreement in
2011 at a United Nations conference in South Africa. Speaking at the European
Parliament in Strasbourg, France, Ms. Hedegaard said she had hoped to
complete a treaty this year in Mexico, 'but the signals coming out of various
capitals of big emitters unfortunately do not make that likely."' John M. Broder,
China and India Join Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/ 2010/03/10/world/lOclimate.html.
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wasting billions of dollars in an environmental Cold War while the
talks decline into the interminable years of debate.
The recently closed second round of the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue has provided hope for the posi-
tive development of a cooperative, bilateral partnership between
the U.S. and China to deal with various international issues of
common concern, including climate change. Indeed, the joint
development of clean energy technologies may prove an effective
mechanism to remove a core obstacle to the multilateral climate
change negotiations. The U.S. and China reaching a firm bilateral
agreement would greatly contribute to the final success of the Post-
Copenhagen negotiations.
All sides managed to preserve their bottom lines at
Copenhagen, but the next round of negotiations will bring more
fascinating power contests regarding global governance of climate
change. Now exposed, the human race can only hope that the U.S.
and China use the powerful mechanisms at their disposal to find
new solutions in the manner President Obama described at the end
of the Copenhagen Conference:
To continue moving forward we must draw on the
effort that allowed us to succeed here today -
engagement among nations that represent a baseline
of mutual interest and mutual respect. Climate
change threatens us all; therefore, we must bridge
old divides and build new partnerships to meet this
great challenge of our time. That's what we've
begun to do here today. 322
322 Barack Obama, Obama's Remarks on the Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/ 9climate.
text.html.
